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THE ASBESTOS HEALTH HAZARDS
COMPENSATION ACT: A LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION TO A LITIGATION CRISIS
Eugene R. Anderson *
Irene C. Warshauer **
Adrienne M. Coffn***
The United States and its courts are currently enmeshed in a litiga-
tion crisis.1 This crisis is manifested by the growing number of per-
sonal injury and property damage actions against manufacturers whose
products allegedly causing latent and occupation diseases, resulting
from exposure to those products as much as 40 years ago. Nationwide,
there are presently pending over 11,000 asbestos-related cases,z 600
DES-related cases,' 400-700 formaldehyde-related cases, 4 numerous
benzene-related cases, 5 400 toxic shock syndrome cases,6 and 2,775
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I. See generaly Winter, Asbestos Legal 'Tidal Wave' Is Closing In, 68 A.B.A. J. 397 (1982);
Shea, Product Liability: A Continuing Process of Change, 68 A.B.A. J. 576 (1982); and Toxic
Torts: A Quagmire, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1982, at 53.
2. Affidavit Under Local Rule XI-2 at 5, Debtor's Petition Under Chapter 11, In re Johns-
Manville Corp., No. 82 Bkcy. 11656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed August 26, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as J-M Chapter 11 Affidavit]. We have cited Johns-Manville's figures since it was and
is the largest free-world miner, manufacturer, and distributor of asbestos and, as such, is the
most frequently named defendant in the third party actions. See infra note 53. Much of the
discrepancy in the statistics is the difference in reporting the number of cases; some report the
number of plaintiffs while others report the number of actual cases. In the reports following
Manville's filing of their Chapter 11 Petition, most articles picked up the 16,000 figure which
is actually the number of plaintiffs in the 11,000 cases. See Manville Submits Bankruptcy
Filing to Halt Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, August 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
3. Telephone conversation with Bill Keough, Associate Editor, DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS)
(Dec. 14, 1982). These 600 included two with more than 100 claims each and one case pur-
porting to represent claims of 3,800 Massachusetts residents. Telephone conversation with
A. Edward Grashof, member of the law firm of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, New
York, N.Y. (Dec. 16, 1982).
4. Ranii, Punitive Damages Given In Formaldehyde Verdict, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 20, 1982, at 7, col.
1. Note that urea-formaldehyde from insulation, the substance which is the subject of these
cases, was banned in March of 1982. After only six months, attorneys involved in these
formaldehyde cases estimate 400-700 cases are pending.
5. The authors were unable to compile accurate estimates of the total number of benzene-re-
lated cases currently pending. A number of attorneys for both the plaintiffs and defendants
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Dalkon Shield cases.7 In addition, approximately 2.4 million persons
make up the class of plaintiffs in the Agent Orange case. 8 In the case of
asbestos alone, cases are being filed at a rate of approximately 425
every month9 and there is no end in sight. The courts are not equipped
to handle these thousands of cases.' 0
Among the prime factors which have contributed to this crisis are:
(1) the lack of adequate benefits available under federal and many state
workers' compensation laws, particularly where benefits are sought for
occupational diseases rather than accidents;11 (2) latency periods of up
to 40 years before diseases associated with exposure to various products
become capable of clinical diagnosis;' 2 (3) the recent expansion of tort
law to encompass strict liability, a concept which provides that a manu-
facturer is liable without fault;' 3 and (4) the retroactive application of
strict liability to products manufactured and sold decades ago.
14
Currently, there is no prompt and equitable system of compensa-
tion for persons disabled by occupationally-related diseases with long
latency periods. Largely because of the inadequacy of existing work-
ers' compensation programs, persons injured by latent occupational
disease have sought relief through lawsuits. This surge of lawsuits has
created a myriad of problems for plaintiffs and defendants alike and
has proved to be an inefficient solution to the problem of compensating
the injured parties.'5
Most of the money spent on the cases goes to plaintiffs' lawyers,
defendants' lawyers and the insurance carriers. Only a small percent of
the money ever reaches the injured party.'6 Moreover, years may pass
from the initial filing of a lawsuit until the case is tried or settled.'"
Often the case is not resolved until after the injured person's death. In
addition, many of the plaintiffs in pending cases have either minimal
in the benzene cases were questioned about the benzene cases. All agreed that the volume is
substantial.
6. Sharkey, Lilly Could Face Huge Lossfrom Recall of Oraflex, Bus. INs., Aug. 16, 1982, at 3,
col. 1. This article focuses on the potential liability claims and expenses incurred when a
product is recalled and cites the problems faced by Procter & Gamble in its recall of Rely
tampons. According to the article, Eli Lilly & Co. recently voluntarily recalled Oraflex, an
arthritis drug, shortly after it was announced that the drug would be banned in England for
90 days.
7. Telephone conversation with Bradfute W. Davenport, Jr., member of the law firm of Mays,
Valentine, Davenport & Moore, Richmond, Va. (Dec. 7, 1982). Mr. Davenport reported that
there were 449 pending claims and 2,775 pending lawsuits as of September 30, 1982. The
aggregate number of claims and cases that had been disposed of as of December 30, 1982
was 4,434-2,595 of which were claims, 2,239 of which were lawsuits.
8. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, Multidistrict Lit. No. 381 (E.D.N.Y.).
9. J-M Chapter 11 Affidavit, supra note 2, at 5.
10. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Lauter, Footing the Billfor Toxic Torts,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
11. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 58-68.
16. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying note 58.
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injuries or no disability but bring suit in hopes of a windfall or out of
concern that a minimal diagnosis will commence the running of the
statute of limitations and preclude recovery at a later date if serious
disability develops.
Manufacturers are faced with liability which was never anticipated
at the time the products were made and which may cost millions of
dollars more than the profits made on the product. Insurance carriers
dispute the application of product liability, general liability, and excess
insurance policy coverage which was sold to the manufacturer to cover
just these sorts of unknown latent problems associated with the manu-
facturer's products.'8 As a result, the viability of the manufacturers is
seriously threatened by the litigation. 9 The detrimental economic ef-
fects on manufacturers will result in a loss of jobs and products which
will adversely impact the economy of the United States.
Experience has shown that neither the workers' compensation laws
nor the courts are equipped to adequately resolve the thousands of
claims arising from latent occupational diseases. Injured parties are
not receiving benefits in proportion to the severity of their injuries and,
with the threatened viability of some manufacturers, some have opined
that there may be no recourse available in future years.2" A legislative
solution is the only answer.
All of these factors are seen in the asbestos litigation. This article
proposes a legislative solution to the product liability crisis by focusing
on the asbestos litigation and the various statutes recently proposed to
resolve that litigation.
BACKGROUND
Asbestos is a term used to describe several naturally occurring
mineral fibers, of which chrysotile, amosite, anthophyllite, and crocido-
18. See generally Rowland, The Asbestosis Battle, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 345 (Sept. 1982).
See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 64 and 78-86. See also Joseph, Firms that didn't mine or
sell asbestos are also caught in the tide of litigation, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1982, at 56, col. 1.
20. Commercial Union Insurance Companies told the United States Supreme Court on Decem-
ber 30, 1981 that "if the compensation criteria set by the D.C. Circuit becomes the law, both
the insurance companies and the asbestos companies face insolvency." Motion for Leave to
File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief as Amicus Curiae of Commercial Union Insurance
Companies In Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit at v, Insurance Company of North America v.
Keene Corporation, No. 81-1012 (Dec. 30, 1981).
Commercial Union, itself, is not facing insolvency. Commercial Union's president and
chief operating officer recently wrote "I want to be quite clear about one thing. Commercial
Union's exposure net of reinsurance, is much less than I year's serious underwriting losses-
so our primary concerns are not short term financial ones." Ward, Coverage for Exposure:
Destructive Judicial Legislation, FOR THE DEFENSE 10, 16 (March 1982) (Howard H. Ward is
the President, Chief Operating Officer, and Director of Commercial Union Insurance Com-
panies.) See also Lewin,Asbestos Now Company Peril, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1982 at D2, col.
1; Noble,Asbestos Claimants Angered by Filing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982 at D4, col. 5; and
Two Tales of Poison, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at A22, col. I (Editorial).
1983]
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lite are commercially important.2 It is a unique thermal insulator, ca-
pable of withstanding very high temperatures without burning. In
addition, some grades of asbestos fiber can be woven into cloth.2 2 As-
bestos has been used for centuries; Pliny the Elder wrote of it,
2 3
Charlemagne is reputed to have had a coat and tablecloth made of as-
bestos,2 4 and the ancient Romans used it for lamp wicks and cremation
cloths.25
Although asbestos remained largely a novelty until its use in steam
engines in the 19th Century, in the late 1800's and early 1900's its use
became widespread. 26  Because of its excellent fire retardation and
binding qualities, asbestos was and is an essential part of the modem
industrial world. It has over 3,000 applications, ranging from ironing
board covers to rocket nose cones, from automobile brake linings2 7 to
theatre curtains,28 and from insulating cement to filters for food and
drug purification. 9 Perhaps the most common use of asbestos is in
thermal insulation products.
Shipboard fire was the scourge of sailors for untold generations and
was largely alleviated by asbestos insulation.30  By 1937 the United
21. For an account of the commercial uses of asbestos, see R. CLIFTON, BUREAU OF MINES, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ASBESTOS (Mineral Commodity Profiles, July 1979).
22. For accounts of the unique physical properties of asbestos, see Brodeur, The Magic Mineral,
NEW YORKER, October 12, 1968, at 117. The entry in the 1910 edition of Encyclopedia
Brittanica entitled "Asbestos," is almost lyrical in its details of the industrial and commercial
applications of asbestos making it fascinating and ironic to the contemporary reader yet ex-
plaining the allure of asbestos. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRiTrANICAAsbestos 714 (1lth ed. 1910).
23. Brodeur, supra note 22, at 120. The first edition of the Encyclopedia Brittanica reported that
Pliny, a Roman naturalist, had "seen napkins made of asbestos, which, being taken foul from
the table, were thrown into the fire, and better scoured than if they had been washed in
water." ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA Asbestos 429 (Ist ed. 1771).
24. Brodeur, supra note 22, at 120. See also 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA.Asbestos 714 (11th
ed. 1910) which notes that Charlemagne was said to have cleaned his tablecloth by throwing
it into the fire.
25. Brodeur, supra note 22, at 120; and 7 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA Fibres, Natural 288
(15th ed. 1974).
26. 7 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANICA Fibres, Natural 289 (15th ed. 1974).
27. 0. BOWLES, BUREAU OF MINES, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ASBESTOS: A MATERIALS
SURVEY 1 (1959) (Information Circular No. 7880) [hereinafter cited as 0. BOWLES, BUREAU
OF MINES]. Bowles notes that ". . . virtually all brake lining and clutch facings of
automobiles. . . consist essentially of asbestos. Hence, a shortage of asbestos used in fric-
tion materials would tend to immobilize highway transport." Id.
28. "Back in the nineteen-twenties when the word asbestos frequently appeared in large block
letters on the fireproof drop curtain that closed off the proscenium openings of theatre stages,
it was customary in certain parts of the country for youngster[s] attending Saturday-matinee
performances. . . to greet the raising of the asbestos curtain with the chant '4ll School
Boys Eat Stewed Tomatoes On Saturday!" Brodeur, supra note 22, at 117.
29. Letter from Roscoe W. Davis, President of AMF CUNO Microfitration Products Division,
to Glenn W. Bailey, Chairman of Bairnco Corporation (March 8, 1982) (notes that asbestos
is not banned by the FDA and that it is currently used in Pharmaceutical and Food and
Beverage Markets) (available upon request from the authors); and Brodeur, Department of
Ampication, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1971, at 147, 153-4.
30. A Vice Admiral of the Navy stated in a 1979 letter: "[e]ven though the use of asbestos as
thermal insulation has been eliminated, there remain a few shipboard applications where
technically acceptable substitute asbestos-free materials have not yet been identified. There-
fore, all ships presently in service contain some quantity of asbestos." Draft Letter from T.J.
Bigley to Robert F. Hughes, Ass't. Dir., G.A.O. (Jan. 5, 1979) (on file at offices of the JOUR-
NAL OF LEGISLATION).
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States specified the use of asbestos in thermal insulation products in
navy vessels,3' primarily for use in the pipes and pipe coverings.32 The
use of asbestos-containing thermal insulation products increased enor-
mously with the United States Government's development of a modem
navy during World War II,33 and as late as 1969, the United States
Navy was the largest user of asbestos in the country.34
The publication in 1965 of a study by Doctors Selikoff, Churg, and
Hammond marked the first reported general recognition that asbestos
presented a health hazard to insulators who had worked with asbestos-
containing insulation.35 The study indicated that asbestos may cause
certain diseases in persons exposed to asbestos dust and fibers during
insulation application. Prior studies, however, had indicated that insu-
lation workers were not at risk.
36
The possible health problem from exposure to asbestos was not rec-
ognized sooner because of the extremely long period of time before the
purported asbestos-related diseases are capable of clinical diagnosis.37
Asbestosis, a scarring of the alveoli which results in shortness of breath,
and mesothelioma, a cancer of the pleura or the peritoneum which gen-
erally causes death within two years of development of a tumor, are
seldom manifested less than twenty years following occupational expo-
sure. 3  The incubation period for these diseases is twenty to forty or
more years.39
31. Fleischer, Viles, Grade & Drinker,.4 Health Survey of Pioe Covering Operations in Construct-
ing Naval Vessels, 28 J. INDUS. HYGIENE & TOXICOLOGY 9 (Jan. 1946) [hereinafter cited as
the Fleischer-Drinker Report].
32. Lawton, Barboo & Sullivan, SignOfcance and Description of Exposures in the Fabrication, In-
stallation, and Jemoval ofAsbestos Material in U.S. Navy Shipyards, in SAFETY AND HEALTH
IN SHIPBUILDING AND SHIP REPAIRING, INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, GENEVA (1971) (on file at
offices of the JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION). See also supra note 31.
33. Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982: Hearing on H.A 5735 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor Standards ofthe House Comm. on Education andLabor, 97th Cong., 2nd
Sess., unpublished statement at 3-5 (1982) (statement of Victor L. Drexel, Vice-President and
Corporate Counsel, Amatex Corporation, April 21, 1982). (The hearings have not yet been
published, therefore, references to Mr. Drexel's testimony are made to his prepared state-
ment which is on file at the offices of the JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION) [hereinafter cited as
Drexel Testimony].
34. Drexel Testimony, supra note 33, at 3.
35. Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occurrence ofAsbestosis Among Insulation Workers in the
United States, 132 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. SCI. 112 (1965) was the first study with enough
subjects followed through a sufficient period of time for proof of a correlation between asbes-
tos and disease.
36. Fleischer-Drinker Report, supra note 31.
37. See infra note 39.
38. The diseases are described in DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASE
IN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR 19-29 (I.J. Selikoff, principal
investigator) (ASPER Contract No. J-9-M-8-0165) [hereinafter cited as SELIKOFF LABOR RE-
PORT]. Dr. Selikof's report is available from Howard Vincent at the Department of Labor.
Plaintiffs have also alleged that bronchogenic carcinoma (lung cancer) was caused by
exposure to asbestos. Whether lung cancer is actually caused by exposure to asbestos is
currently in dispute. See infra notes 189-195 and accompanying text.
39. See Selikoff, Hammond & Seidman, Latency of Asbestos Disease Among Insulation Workers
in the U.S. and Canada, 46 CANCER 2736-40 (1980), and Selikoff, Cancer Risk of Asbestos
Exposure in ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER, BOOK C, HUMAN RISK ASSESSMENT, COLD
SPRING HARBOR CONFERENCES ON CELL PROLIFERATION vol. 4 (1977) for discussions of
19831
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Estimates indicated that as many as 16,000 cases have been brought
by more than 25,000 plaintiffs against manufacturers of asbestos and
products containing asbestos, 40 and more than 11,000 cases are cur-
rently pending.41 Exposure to asbestos aboard naval ships built at
United States Government shipyards or United States contract ship-
yards has been estimated to account for more than fifty per cent of the
pending asbestos cases.42 Most of the 16,000 cases have been brought
by insulation workers or persons in allied trades who worked near the
insulators when they applied asbestos products.
43
According to a recent study prepared for the Department of Labor,
twenty-seven million persons were occupationally exposed to asbestos
during the period of 1940 through 1979." Claims in the asbestos law-
suits and current publicity regarding the health effects of asbestos are
based upon contentions that many of those persons will develop dis-
eases resulting, at least in part, from that occupational exposure, and
some will die of asbestos-related disease. In addition, litigants have
brought so-called "household exposure" cases, basing their claims for
relief on studies that have indicated that mesothelioma may develop in
a member of a household of a person occupationally exposed to
asbestos.45
Currently, there exists no prompt, equitable, and reasonably uni-
form system of compensation for persons who develop asbestos-related
diseases.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS
Injured parties have found state and federal workers' compensation
programs inefficient and inadequate.46 Approximately one year passes
latency as a medical phenomenon. The latter states "with but few exceptions, serious risk
begins after 20 years from onset of first exposure and continues from that point on."
40. Feder, Manville Submits Bankruptcy Filing to Halt Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at 1,
col. 6.
Estimates vary as to the true number of asbestos cases. The Administrative Office of
United States Courts has responsibility for maintaining statistics on cases in the federal
courts. Currently, that office only breaks down cases into broad categories, such as product
liability; it does not further break them down into third-party liability suits resulting from
asbestos-related disease. This record system, however, is being modified to enable data gen-
eration of statistics on finer categories and should be available in two to three years. Tele-
phone interview with David Gentry, Branch Chief, Non-Criminal Section of the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (Aug. 4, 1982).
41. J-M Chapter 11 Affidavit, supra note 2, at 4-5. Because of Manville's past and present domi-
nant position in the use of asbestos and asbestos-containing products, it is a defendant in
almost all third-party actions. See J-M Chapter 11 Affidavit, supra note 2, at 3-4. See also In
re Asbestos Related Cases 23 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 523, 825 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Therefore,
the statistics used in this article are drawn from Manville's Chapter 11 Affidavit.
42. The Asbestos Dilemma, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 1, 1982; and infra note 43.
43. Appellant's Brief at 3, Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 82-6023 (2d Cir. Brief filed May
1982) (appeal pending).
44. SELIKOFF LABOR REPORT, supra note 38, at 99.
45. See Anderson, Lilis, Daum & Selikoff, Asbestosis Among Household Contacts of Asbestos
Factory Workers, 330 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sc. 387 (1979).
46. See articles by Senator Gary Hary and Representative George Miller in which they explain
their reasons for introducing asbestos compensation bills. Miller, Don't Let Industry Shirk Its
[Vol. 10:25
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before a disabled worker begins to receive compensation for an occupa-
tional disease in contrast to an average wait of only two months before
receiving compensation for a worker's accident claim.47 According to a
recent study cited by the Department of Labor, nearly ninety percent of
occupational dust disease awards are initially contested, compared to
only ten percent of accident awards.4 8 Even more significant, studies
show that those persons who receive compensation for their occupa-
tional diseases receive only about one-eighth of their expected lost
wages from workers' compensation funds.49
In addition to the delays and insufficiency of workers' compensa-
tion for occupational diseases, a person injured as a result of occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos is often effectively barred from bringing a
compensation claim because of the twenty to forty year latency period
for asbestos-related disease. Some state workers' compensation laws
require workers to file their claim shortly after their last day of work, a
requirement which is often a practical impossibility in terms of claim-
ing compensation for asbestos-related diseases.50 Workers' compensa-
tion systems also provide no solution for those persons who allege they
have contracted mesothelioma through household exposure. These in-
jured parties are not eligible for benefits under any existing workers'
compensation program since it was a member of their household, and
not they, who were occupationally exposed to asbestos.
Recognizing the failure of the workers' compensation programs,
persons alleging disability from asbestos-related diseases have fled to
the courts for relief. Litigation, however, has proved to be an ex-
tremely slow, inefficient, expensive, and wasteful remedy and, to many,
the only real winners in the asbestos litigation are lawyers and some
insurance companies.5"
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
By the end of 1980, 5,087 cases brought by 9,300 plaintiffs were
pending against Manville Corporation52 (Manville), the largest free-
world miner of asbestos and manufacturer of asbestos-containing prod-
Duty, and Hart, Let Government Bear its Share in.Asbestos Legislation: Who Compensates the
Victims, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1982, at 2F, col. 3. See also Compensation System Fails Disease
Victims, AFL-CIO News, July 12, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
47. Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2847 Before the Senate
Comm on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1980) (statement of Nik B.
Edes, Deputy Under Secretary for Legislation, Dep't of Labor) (citing P. BARTH & A. HUNT,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES (1980)).
48. DEP'T OF LABOR, INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 71 (1980)
(cites its sources as P. BARTH & A. HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED
ILLNESSES AND DISEASES, 178 (1980)) [hereinafter referred to as INTERIM REPORT].
49. Id. at 74.
50. See Chart IV Coverage of Occupational Diseases, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS
OF WORKERS COMPENSATION LAWS 10 (1982) (column entitled "Time Limit on Claim
Filing").
51. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
52. J-M Chapter 11 Affidavit, supra note 2, at 5.
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ucts.-5 By the end of 1981, 9,300 cases brought by 12,800 plaintiffs were
pending and, six months later, Manville was a named defendant in
11,000 cases brought by 15,550 plaintiffs.54 According to Manville, by
July 1982, cases were being filed at a rate of approximately 425 per
month by approximately 495 plaintiffs.5 By July 1982, however,
Manville had only disposed of 3,470 of the claims that had ever been
brought against it.
5 6
The enormous influx of lawsuits in the past few years, coupled with
the continuing high rate of filings, has caused an even greater backlog
in the already crowded court calendars. So great is the burden that
some courts have appointed full-time "asbestos judges" and special
masters who handle only asbestos-related claims. In another effort to
solve the backlog, the Philadelphia courts have established a program
of non-jury trials, with a right of jury trial de novo, to try the asbestos
cases.
57
Asbestos litigation has not proved to be the expeditious means of
compensation that plaintiffs had hoped it would be. On the average,
three to four years pass from the filing of a lawsuit to its resolution by
settlement or trial. Of the cases which have actually gone to trial,
plaintiffs and defendants have each won about halt 5 9 Even after years
of waiting, there is no guarantee of an equitable settlement or verdict in
a given case. On the contrary, plaintiffs' awards and verdicts are often
uneven and vary dramatically despite similar injuries. A prime exam-
ple of the disparate results occurred in five recent asbestos cases in
Texas. In the Federal Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Beau-
mont Division, five separate asbestos cases were tried simultaneously.60
Five juries were empanelled, each sitting in a different case, and all five
were brought into one courtroom where all the jurors heard the same
evidence. After separately deliberating on the same evidence, the juries
reached completely different findings regarding defendants' liability.
53. Id. at 3-4. See also 0. BOWLES, BUREAU OF MINES, sufpra note 27, at 36. Some authors have
indicated that Manville produces approximately 70% of the world's asbestos. Note, Compen-
sating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 933 n. 115 (1980) (citing Swee-
ney, The Asbestos Time Bomb, TRIAL, Oct. 1978, at 17).
54. J-M Chapter 11 Affidavit, supra note 2, at 5.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id.
57. See Pittsburg Coming Corp. v. Bradley, No. 70-Misc. Doc., 1982, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Sup. Ct.
Pa. Dec. 14, 1982), which discusses the reasons underlying Philadelphia General Court Reg-
ulation 82-5. Note also that six asbestos judges have been appointed in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas alone. See The Asbestos Mess, Washington Post, Apr. 27, 1982.
58, The Asbestos Mess, supra note 57.
59. Hart, Let Government Bear its Share, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1982, at 2F, col. 5. See also The
Asbestos Mess, supra note 57.
60. Marx v. Fibreboard Corp., No. B-80-621-CA (E.D. Tex. July 23, 1982); Gracedel v.
Fibreboard Corp., No. B-80-658-CA (E.D. Tex. July 23, 1982); Robinson v. Fibreboard
Corp. No. 8-81-488-CA (E.D. Tex. July 23, 1982); Robinson v. Fibreboard Corp., No. B-81-
488-CA (E.D. Tex. July 23, 1982); Babineaux v. Fibreboard Corp., No. B-81-323-CA (E.D.
Tex. July 23, 1982); and Migues v. Nicolet Industries, No. B-78-768-CA (E.D. Tex. July 23,
1982).
[Vol. 10:25
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The verdicts ranged from no liability6' to a finding of defendants' duty
to warn, in 1935, of the dangers of asbestos.62  In the latter case, the
jury also held Johns-Manville liable for punitive damages.
As a system of compensating injured parties, asbestos litigation is a
failure. Estimates have indicated that of every dollar paid by the de-
fendants, only ten to twenty cents actually goes to compensate the per-
son affected by asbestos-related disease or the person's survivors.
Approximately eighty to ninety cents out of every dollar goes to law-
yers, including defense lawyers, and to insurance companies.63
61. Marx v. Fibreboard Corp., No. B-80-621-CA (E.D. Tex. July 23, 1982).
62. Gracedel v. Fibreboard Corp., No. B-80-658-CA (E.D. Tex. July 23, 1982).
63. Similar to the range of statistics for the number of asbestos cases brought to date, see supra
note 2, the figures for the amounts going to lawyers, insurance companies and plaintiffs vary.
Most of the variation in the figures is due to the different ways in which persons compute the
figures, and the factors and costs of litigation each takes into consideration. In order to
calculate how much of each dollar spent toward asbestos litigation goes to the claimant, we
first cite the amount spent by the defendant; next we cite statistics from plaintiffs regarding
how much of the dollars paid by the defendant actually goes to the claimant.
(a) Money paid by defendant.
"Executives from Commercial Union Insurance Co. testified [before the House Subcom-
mittee on Labor Standards] that for every dollar paid to a claimant up to $3.40 may be paid
in additional legal fees." ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4,861 (April 23, 1982). Thus, of
every dollar spent by Commercial Union, 77.3C goes toward defense costs while only 22.7c
goes to the plaintiff and his attorneys.
In Mary Rowland's recent article focusing on the effects ofKeene v. 1NA, (D.D.C. 1982),
she quotes a representative from Travelers Insurance Co. as stating that Travelers pays an
additional 30¢ in legal fees for every dollar paid to the claimant. In an asbestos-related
disease case, however, for every dollar paid on a claim, Travelers pays around 81¢ in legal
fees. Of every dollar spent by Travelers in an asbestos-related disease case, 44.8c goes to-
ward defense costs, while only 55.2C goes to the plaintiff and plaintiffs' attorneys. Rowland,
supra note 18, at 353.
(b) Money paid to plaintiffs, lawyers, andfor litigation expenses.
When these companies refer to money paid to the plaintiff, they do not take into consid-
eration the portion of the money which must be paid by the plaintiff for his or her legal costs.
Victor E. Schwartz, a partner in the law firm of Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C., and
an adjunct professor of law at American University, said "that for every six cents paid to an
asbestos victim, seven cents is paid to an attorney involved in the litigation." ASBESTOS
LITIGATION REP. (ANDREWS) 4,679 (March 12, 1982). Using Mr. Schwartz' figures, of the
money actually paid to the plaintiff approximately 53.8% goes to the plaintiff's attorney while
only 46.2% goes to the plaintiff.
(c) Money paid to claimants.
,Using Victor Schwartz' estimates, of the 22.7c that Commercial Union pays to the plain-
tiff, the plaintiffs lawyer receives approximately 12.2C while the plaintiff receives only 10.5c.
With respect to the 45C paid to the plaintiff by Travelers, the plaintiffs lawyer receives
approximately 240 and the plaintiff receives only 214Z. The plaintiff must still, in many cases,
reimburse the workers' compensation fund for any award or medical payments made under
the workers' compensation system.
Regarding the plaintiffs' payments for attorneys, court costs, and repayment of workers'
compensation, Unarco estimated that "while defendants were spending approximately
$150,000 for each case settled, plaintiffs netted approximately $28,000." ASBESTOS LITIGA-
TION REP. (ANDREWS) 4,861 (April 23, 1982). Unarco's estimates indicate that of every dol-
lar spent on an asbestos case only 18.6€ actually goes to the plaintiff.
The figures given by Manville in the Chapter I 1 papers also appear to be in accord. See
J-M Chapter I I Affidavit, supra note 2, at 6-7.
See also Bulow, Jackson & Mnookin, Winners and Losers in the Manville Bankruptcy,
Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1982; Gibson, When Lawyers Prosper, FORBES, Mar. 30, 1983, at 43; The
Asbestos Dilemma, supra note 42; Courting Trouble, Boston Globe, Sept. 1, 1982; The Asbes-
tos Mess, supra note 57.
Journal of Legislation
The Viability of Defendants
.Perhaps the most serious problem caused by the asbestos litigation
is the threatened viability of some manufacturers. As of January 1,
1983, three manufacturers of asbestos-containing products have filed
for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.' This problem
directly affects the plaintiffs in asbestos cases since compensation can
continue only as long as the assets last.65 -The cause of the threat to
manufacturers is threefold: (1) the retroactive application of strict lia-
bility to asbestos products sold decades before the dangers of asbestos
were known;66 (2) the dispute over insurance coverage;67 and (3) the
number of pending and potential lawsuits.68
Strict Liability in Asbestos Cases. In recent years, tort law has de-
veloped the theory of strict liability, a concept which essentially pro-
vides that a manufacturer is liable for any harm caused by its product
regardless of whether the manufacturer had knowledge of any possible
defects and regardless of any negligence or fault on the part of the
manufacturer.69 Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides, in part, that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer .. ."7o The comments to 402A further provide that
where a seller "has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a
particular use . . .. he may be required to give adequate warning of
the danger . . . , and a product sold without such warning is
defective."'"
In asbestos cases, courts are applying the strict liability theory to
asbestos-containing products manufactured as long ago as 1930. More-
over, warnings have been found inadequate and a user's knowledge
that he could have been injured by a product is deemed irrelevant un-
less he knew of the specific injury which might develop. For example,
the plaintiff in Borel v. Fibreboard72 testified that he thought he could
get tuberculosis from exposure to asbestos. 73 "[The court] quoted Bo-
rel's testimony: 'A. Yes, I knew the dust was bad but we used to talk
[about] it among the insulators, [about] how bad was this dust, could it
64. See infra notes 78, 80, 85.
65. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 69-75.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77.
68. Manville predicted that the potential number of lawsuits that would be filed against it would
be 52,000. Summary of Asbestos-related litigation projection (Sept. 9, 1982) (delivered by
Manville to the Organizational Meeting of Creditors of Manville); Walker, Projections of
Asbestos-related disease 1982-2009 (1982) (reports available upon request from the authors).
69. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13
A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963), is the landmark case on strict liability.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
71. Id. at § 402A comment h.
72. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 1082, 1104.
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give you TB, could it give you this, and everyone was saying no, that
dust don't hurt you, it dissolves as it hits your lungs. That was the
question you get all the time.' "I7 The Borel court held that such be-
liefs did not constitute knowledge that asbestos was dangerous and
found that the warning to avoid breathing the asbestos dust was
insufficient.75
Disputed Coverage by Insurance Companies.76  Further com-
pounding the asbestos litigation situation, the insurance companies dis-
pute the coverage of product liability, comprehensive general liability,
and excess insurance policies sold to the manufacturers from the 1930's
through 1982.
Currently, more than fifteen lawsuits are pending between manu-
facturers of asbestos-containing products and their insurance carriers."7
The insurance carriers have attempted to avoid defending their policy-
holders and to avoid providing the insurance coverage they sold to
manufacturers. Many manufacturers have been forced to engage in ex-
tensive litigation to obtain the insurance coverage that they purchased.
Potential Liability. Until recently many persons voiced skepticism
as to whether the viability of any of the defendant manufacturers was
actually threatened by the asbestos litigation. On July 29, 1982, how-
ever, UNR Industries, Inc., the parent company of Unarco Industries,
Inc., one of the asbestos manufacturers, filed for reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.7" The tremendous exposure to
liability for asbestos-related claims and insurance coverage disputes
with Unarco's insurance carmers were cited as the reasons for Unarco's
financial difficulties.79
On August 26, 1982, Manville, formerly Johns-Manville Corpora-
tion, along with all of its North American subsidiaries, filed for reor-
ganization under Chapter 11.80 As with Unarco, Manville cited the
asbestos lawsuits as the reason for its petitioning for reorganization."
74. Id. at 1104.
75. Id. at 1104-1109.
76. For an analysis of the disputes see Oshinsky, Gilbert & Shulman, Trigger and Scope of Cov-
erage Under Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies in Toxic Substances Cases; 3
LEGAL NOTE & VIEWPOINTS QUARTERLY 95 (Nov. 1982); Oshinsky, Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance: Trigger and Scope of Coverage in Long-term Exposure Cases, 17 FORUM
1035 (Spring 1982); Oshinsky, Insurance Coveragefor Asbestos Tort Liability Litigation, 5 J.
PROD. LiAB. 69 (1982); OSHlNsKY, GILBERT & LEVY, TRIGGER AND SCOPE OF INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN Toxic SUBSTANCE CASES (1982) (prepared for Defense Research Institute
Seminar); Anderson & Levy, Insurance Coveragefor Personal Injury Occurring Over a Long
Term or in Multiple Policy Years, INS. ADVOCATE, June 5, 1982, at 21.
77. A complete listing of these cases is available from the authors.
78. Debtor's Petition Under Chapter 11, In re UNR Industries, Inc., No. 82B09841 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill filed July 29, 1982).
79. Lewin, Asbestos Suits Divide Insurers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1982 at D2, col. 1.
80. Debtor's Petition Under Chapter 11, In re Johns-Manville Corp., No. 82 Bkcy. 11656
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982).
81. Manville Corporation Press Release, Manville Files for Reorganization (Aug. 26, 1982)
(available at JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION Offices). Manville'r Big Concern as it Files in Chapter
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In its press release announcing its Chapter 11 filing, Manville stated
that the asbestos litigation "problem was made more acute due to Gov-
ernment refusal to accept responsibility for persons injured in ship-
yards during World War II and later, Congressional delays in dealing
with the occupational disease compensation problem, and the failure of
insurance companies to fulfill their obligations to Manville."82
Manville, as the largest free-world miner and manufacturer of as-
bestos and products containing asbestos, is the most frequently named
defendant in the asbestos cases. 3 Thus, its filing Chapter 11 has al-
ready further delayed the pending cases as the Bankruptcy Court and
other courts determine the effect Manville's action will have on the as-
bestos litigation.
The same week as Manville's Chapter 11 filing, another asbestos
manufacturer omitted its annual dividend. In 1981, that same manu-
facturer reduced the dividend it has now omitted. The company has
stated that it does not intend to file a Chapter 11 petition.84
A third asbestos manufacturer, Amatex Corporation, filed its Chap-
ter 11 petition on November 1, 1982.85 Once again, the asbestos litiga-
tion was cited as the reason for seeking reorganization. Unless and
until measures are taken to prevent further bankruptcies, the issue of
compensation for parties injured by asbestos-related diseases may sim-
ply become a race to the courthouse steps.86
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
The first legislation proposing a compensation program for persons
disabled by or who died as a result of an asbestos-related disease was
introduced in the 93rd Congress.87 Three bills were introduced in the
97th Congress. Each proposed a solution to the problem of compensat-
ing persons disabled by asbestos-releated diseases. The three bills
were: the Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 198288
11 is Litigation, Not Debt, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6; Feder, Manville Submits
Bankruptcy Filing to Halt Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6; Lewin, The
Legal Issues in Manville's Move, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982 at D4, col. 1. See also Despite
Strong Business, Litigation Forces Manville to File for Reorganization, Wall St. J., Aug. 27,
1982, at 29 (paid advertisement).
82. Manville Corporation Press Release, supra note 81. See also Manville Sues its Insurers for
StillMore, Bus. INS., Sept. 6, 1982, at 31. (This article focuses on Manville's request to
amend a 1980 suit against various insurers. "Claiming its insurers' wrongful conduct forced
it into bankruptcy, Manville Corp. wants an additional $5 billion in damages from some of
them.")
83. See supra note 53.
84. Manville's Big Concern As It Files in Chapter 11 Is Litigation, Not Debt, supra note 81.
85. Voluntary Case, Debtor's Petition, In re Amatex Corp., No. 82-05220 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. filed
Nov. 1, 1982).
86. See generally supra note 20. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, supra note 41.
87. H.R. 6906, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 12,258 (1973). The Asbestosis and
Mesothelioma Benefits Act was introduced by Representative Frelinghuysen with co-spon-
sorship by the entire New Jersey delegation.
88. H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. H715 (daily ed. March 4, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as the Miller Bill]. The co-sponsors of the bill are Representative Carl D. Perkins (D-
Ky.), Pat Williams (D-Mont.), and Millicent H. Fenwick (R-N.J.). The bill was referred to
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introduced by Representative George Miller (D-Cal.) (Miller Bill); the
Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 198189 introduced by
Senator Gary Hart (D-Colo.) (Hart Bill); and the Asbestos Health
Hazards Compensation Act9 introduced by Representative Millicent
Fenwick (R-N.J.) (Fenwick Bill).
The myriad of problems faced in the pending asbestos litigation has
resulted in support by all parties, in theory at least, of a legislative solu-
tion to the asbestos litigation problem.9' While the introduction of
these bills in Congress shows the recognition of a need for a legislative
solution to the asbestos problem, none of them, by itself, is the answer.
A "Model Asbestos Compensation Act" (Model Bill), however, is ap-
pended to this article. It is a composite bill drawing sections from each
of the three bills together with some new proposals.
Through the Model Bill the authors attempt to resolve certain sub-
stantive aspects of the previously introduced bills over which there is
considerable disagreement. Prime areas of controversy include:
(1) Whether the federal government should contribute to an Asbestos
Compensation Fund (Fund);92
(2) Whether the Fund should be the exclusive remedy for injured
parties;93
(3) How contributions to the Fund should be apportioned;94
(4) Whether certain diseases should be presumed to have been caused
by exposure to asbestos;9"
(5) Whether those contributions required under the bill should be
covered by the contributing entity's insurance policies;96 and
(6) Whether asbsestos-related disease resulting from household expo-
sure to asbestos should constitute a compensable disability.
9 7
Government Responsibility
Of the three bills, the Miller Bill and the Fenwick Bill largely ex-
clude the United States from liability for its role in asbestos-related
the Subcommittee on Labor Standards, Committee on Education and Labor;, Representative
Miller is the subcommittee's chairman.
89. S.1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S10,033-38 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as the Hart Bill]. The 1981 Hart Bill is a modified version of Senator Gary W.
Hart's (D-Colo.) Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1980. S.2847, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S7293-99 (daily ed. June 18, 1980). For a discussion of the Hart
Bill see SCHRIBER, RECENT FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND ENACTMENTS, Toxic
SUBSTANCES: PROBLEMS IN LITIGATION 291 (1981).
90. H.R. 5224, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONO. REc. H9,670 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as the Fenwick Bill]. Representative Fenwick's first bill dealing with the asbestos
problem was introduced in 1977 and was entitled "The Asbestos Health Hazards Compensa-
tion Act of 1977." H.R. 8689, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONo. REc. 26,230 (1977).
91. Schechter, Untangling the Asbestos Mess, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY, Feb. 1982, at
30.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 97-124.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 125-136.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 137-174.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 175-199.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 200-203.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 204-207.
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diseases. This position is untenable, however, because the United
States played a substantial role in the use of asbestos and products con-
taining asbestos.
The United States has been an importer, manufacturer, buyer,
seller, specifier, and stockpiler of asbestos. During World War II the
federal government listed asbestos as a strategic mineral and thereby
controlled its use.98 As a seller, the government sold asbestos to domes-
tic industry. To this day the government continues to stockpile
asbestos.99
Beginning in 1937 the Government specified the use of asbestos in
Navy ships being built by Government employees in its own shipyards
and by civilians in shipyards under contract to it."° In many cases, in
fact, manufacturers began to add asbestos to their products only in or-
der to comply with government specifications. 101
Shipyard workers, whose third-party lawsuits appear to account for
more than fifty percent of the pending litigation, were exposed to asbes-
tos in the course of building and maintaining ships for the Navy during
World War II and thereafter when the government was developing a
modem two-ocean navy. 102 It has been argued, with some justification,
that these workers' injuries and disabilities are a delayed cost of World
War II and the defense effort, whose cost should be borne by society as
a whole.'
0 3
.The United States assumed a key role in monitoring the health ef-
fects of asbestos. In a 1938 government report, a safety level for expo-
sure to asbestos dust was recommended." This standard proved to be
"tragically incorrect." In 1946 the government issued a report on the
health effects related to the use of asbestos-containing products in the
98. 0. BOWLES, BUREAU OF MINES, supra note 27, at 75-94.
99. Clifton, Asbestos, in U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, 1978-1979 BUREAU
OF MINES MINERALS YEARBOOK.
100. Appellants Brief, supra note 43, at 3.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 33, 42.
103. The Hart Bill, supra note 89, 127 CONG. REC. at S 10033 (statement of Sen. Hart introducing
S. 1643). At the Oversight hearing regarding the effect of the Manville and UNR bankrup-
ties on compensation for asbestos-related disease, the government made clear its position
that "it has no tort liability to the victims of asbestos-related diseases." Thus, the govern-
ment feels that it should not be required to contribute to any asbestos compensation fund.
Oversight Hearings on the Effect of the Manville and UNR Bankruptcies on Compensation of
Asbestos Victims Before Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education &
Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of J. Paul McGrath, assistant U.S. Atty. Gen.
on Sept. 9, 1982) (not yet published) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
104. W. DRESSEN, J. DALLAVALLE, J. EDWARDS, J. MILLER & R. SAVERS, A STUDY OF ASBESTO-
SIS IN THE ASBESTOS TEXTILE INDUSTRY, Pub. Health Bull. No. 241 (1938). In this report,
the authors recommended a standard for exposure to asbestos dust of five million particles
per cubic foot. In 1970 the Government recommended a new standard of two million fibers
per cubic foot. Currently, OSHA is considering revising this standard to either a 0.5-fiber
level, as proposed in 1975, or a 0.1 fiber level, proposed in 1980. Asbestos: Vance Sees
OSH4 Proposal By Late 1983; Industry Representatives Criticize Lag, [Current Report]
O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 339 (Sept. 23, 1982); and Federal Curbs on Asbestos Found 'Grossly Inad-
equate', N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1980, at A18, col. 5.
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shipyards.' 5 Concluding that insulators were not at risk from the ex-
posure to asbestos, the Fleischer-Drinker Report stated: "Since only
three workers out of the 1074 x-rayed has asbestosis, and each of the
three had been a pipe cover for more than 20 years, it would appear
that asbestosppe covering of naval vessels is a relatively safe occupation.
•... [I]t may be concluded that suchpiue covering is not a dangerous
occupation ."lo6
At the time of the Fleischer-Drinker Report, the Government and
its contractors were the principal users of asbestos in the United States
and following Warld War II the United States continued to be the larg-
est user of asbestos. 10 7 As the leading user of asbestos, the government
was in the best position, in terms of access to data and resources, to
monitor any asbestos-related problems. 0 8 The manufacturers, particu-
larly the smaller companies, therefore, were entitled to rely on the gov-
ernment reports.
In 1943 the United States Government established standards for use
of asbestos in its shipyards. 0 9 These regulations were insufficient. De-
spite their own regulations for the job sites and despite the govern-
ment's control of much of the asbestos industry's work environment,
the government failed to enforce its own regulations concerning the use
of asbestos, well into the 1970's. 110
Government Liability Under Pending Legislation. Currently, the
United States is liable to its present and former employees under the
Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA).l l ' It is liable to non-
government employees through third-party claims under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA)."I2 Although there are approximately 13,000
administrative claims and 1,200 asbestos product liability actions pend-
ing against the United States under the FTCA, the Miller Bill and the
Fenwick Bill would preclude these future third-party claims against the
government and yet would not require government contributions to the
Fund established by the bills. Under both bills the only claims for as-
bestos-related diseases for which the government would be responsible
would be those of its employees brought under FECA.
105. Fleischer-Drinker Report, supra note 31.
106. Id. at 13, 15-16 (emphasis added).
107. Hart, Let Government Bear Its Share, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1982, at 2F, col. 5. See supra note
98 and accompanying text.
108. The Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act of 1936, ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036 (codified as amended
at 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 35-45 (West Supp. 1982)), authorized the Department of Labor to inspect
government job sites. In addition, the Department of HEW conducted industry inspection.
109. U. S. DEP'T OF NAVY AND U.S. MARITIME COMM., MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY
AND HEALTH IN CONTRACT SHIPYARDS (Feb. 1943) (available upon request from the
authors).
110. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 43, at 4-6. Note that in 1977 the United States agreed to
pay $5.7 million as part of a $20 million settlement for 445 workers at an asbestos plant in
Tyler, Texas. The case is not available, however, because it has been sealed by the court.
See N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1977, at 30, col. 1; Bus. WEEK, Dec. 26, 1977, at 42.
I11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (Supp. III 1979).
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (Supp. III 1979).
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Exclusion of Government. Of the three bills, the Miller Bill and the
Fenwick Bill largely exclude the United States from liability for its role
in asbestos-related diseases. This position is untenable, however, be-
cause the United States played a substantial role in the use of asbestos
and products containing asbestos.
The Fenwick Bill provides for the establishment of an Asbestos
Health Hazards Compensation Fund to which certain specified classes
of persons and entities would contribute." 3 Because the federal gov-
ernment is not listed in any of the classes, it would not be liable for
contributions under the Fenwick Bill. Although the United States is
not required to contribute to the Fund, the Fenwick Bill would shield
the government from all third-party claims. Section 301 of the Fen-
wick Bill prohibits a claimant from bringing a third-party suit against
any contributor to the Fund, the labor union which represented the
claimant or the Federal government.' 14 Pursuant to the Fenwick Bill,
therefore, the government would be responsible only for obligations
under FECA.
The Miller Bill also excludes the United States from all liability for
compensating persons injured by asbestos-related diseases. The federal
government is not included in the definition of a "responsible em-
ployer' ' x15 or an "employer"" 6 and is thus excluded from making pay-
ments to the Fund created under the Miller Bill. Under the Miller Bill
the government would be subject only to its employees' claims under
FECA.1
17
The Government As A Responsible Party. The federal government
has played a significant role in the use of asbestos, in establishing work-
place standards which gave positive assurances of safety and as speci-
fier, manufacturer, seller, and stockpiler of the mineral." 8 It would be
unfair to ignore such significant roles by requiring the manufacturers
and others to pay the Government's share in a system of compensation
for persons disabled by asbestos-related disease. The Model Bill and
the Hart Bill, therefore, require the government to bear part of the bur-
den by contributing to their respective Funds.
Unlike the Fenwick and Miller Bills, the Hart Bill includes the fed-
eral government as a contributor to the Fund. Hart's definition of "re-
sponsible party" specifically includes the government and, as such,
requires it to contribute to the Supplemental Fund." 9 Under the pro-
113. Fenwick Bill, supra note 90, §§ 203-204.
114. Id. § 301(3).
115. Miller Bill, supra note 88, § 2(9).
116. Id. § 2(5). The definition of employer specifically excludes the Government. "The term
'employer' means any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, but
shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof." Id. (empha-
sis added).
117. See infra notes 132 to 134 and accompanying text.
118. See Oyersight Hearing, supra note 103.
119. Hart Bill, supra note 89, § 2(10).
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visions of the Hart Bill, the government would be liable for the amount
it would ordinarily pay under FECA to its own employees as well as
for part of the contributions to the Supplemental Compensation Fund
for all injured persons. The compensation is to be paid by responsible
parties according to a set of criteria which clearly make the government
liable for a substantial part of the Fund. 20
The Asbestos Compensation Fund is created under section 13 of the
Model Bill.'' Responsibility for the payment of benefits is assigned to
the claimant's last employer unless the employer proves that it did not
expose the claimant to asbestos for two years or more.122 If the claim-
ant's last employer meets its burden, then the claimant's award is paid
out of the Fund.' 23 Section 13 of the Model Bill requires the federal
government to pay thirty percent of the contributions to the Fund.124
In exchange for these contributions, the government would be immune
from any lawsuit or administrative claim under the FTCA or FECA.
As written, the Fenwick and Miller Bills constitute a "bail-out" of
the federal government by manufacturers of asbestos and asbestos-con-
taining products. Despite the government's leading role in the specifi-
cation and use of asbestos with knowledge of its health effects, these
two bills fail to recognize the government's role as anything other than
an employer. This bail-out should be rejected. The government's cul-
pability must be recognized and it should be required to pay its share of
the compensation for asbestos-related disease.
Exclusivity of Remedy
No-Fault Compensation. Workers' compensation statutes prohibit
an employee from suing an employer for a work-related injury. In re-
turn for this, the employee need not meet the tort law requirement of
proving negligence on the employer's part. Thus, workers' compensa-
tion is a "no-fault" system in which employer-funded workers' com-
pensation insurance pays for any work-related injury or disability.
Provisions in the pending legislation would effectively extend this "no-
fault" compensation theory.
120. Section 8 of the Hart bill establishes the critieria for apportionment. In relevant part it pro-
vides as follows:
(c) The criteria developed by the Commission shall include the establishment of
percentage ranges of liability for a variety of factors including, but not limited to:
(1) the party or parties responsible for the manufacture, design, formula, prepa-
ration, assembly, testing, warning, instruction, marketing, packaging, distribution, or
labeling of any asbestos product;
(2) the party or parties responsible for control of the workplace environment and
for publishing safe exposure limits for the workplace environment; and
(3) the party or parties responsible for establishing the criteria to which product
specifications were designed and products manufactured.
Hart Bill, supra note 89, § (8)(c).
121. The Model Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act is appended to this article, infra
page 55, and is hereinafter cited as the Model Bill.
122. Model Bill, supra note 121, § 12(b).
123. Id.
124. Model Bill, supra note 121, § 13(d)(3).
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Each of the four bills proposes a system of compensation which re-
quires not only employers but also manufacturers of asbestos and other
"responsible parties" to compensate claimants on a "no-fault" basis.'25
Responsible parties would be required to contribute to the Fund with-
out requiring the claimant to show negligence or fault on the contribu-
tor's part. This legislation reflects the tort law development of strict
liability-where neither negligence nor fault must be proved. 126 In ex-
change for this no-fault contribution to the Fund, third-party defend-
ants would be immune from further claims and suits. 27 The injured
party's exclusive remedy would be compensation from the Fund.
Absent the exclusive remedy provision to protect the contributors to
the Fund from the third-party lawsuits, the tremendous burden on the
courts, and enormous sums going to lawyers rather than injured par-
ties, and the threat to the companies' viability would all remain un-
solved problems. Yet, strong opposition to the exclusive remedy
provision has been voiced by labor, trial attorneys, and public interest
groups who consider such a provision a "bail-out" for the so-called "as-
bestos industry."' 128 The defendants in the asbestos cases argue, how-
ever, that without such a provision, the legislative solution would be no
solution at all.129
Exclusivity Under Prior Bills and The Model Bill. The Model Bill
proposes a wholly exclusive remedy for persons affected by asbestos-
related disease. Claimants would no longer file claims with state and
federal workers' compensation boards nor would claimants be permit-
ted to bring third-party lawsuits against those who contribute to the
Fund. 3 ° The sole remedy under the Model Bill would be to file a
claim for compensation with the Federal Office of Workers' Compen-
sation. '3 1 All occupational asbestos-related disease claims would be
processed through the one federal system.
The Miller Bill also proposes to process asbestos-disease claims
through the one Federal Office of Workers' Compensation. 32 Under
the Miller Bill, however, any person who was only exposed to asbestos
while in the employ of the United States' Government, would not be
eligible to seek compensation from the Fund. 33 Those government
125. Id. § 10.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75.
127. Model Bill, supra note 121, § 10. Note also, that any responsible party which fails to pay the
amount assessed is not immune from third-party lawsuits. Id. § 13(h).
128. Historically, trial lawyers, including the American Bar Association, have argued against no-
fault plans "which took business away from trial lawyers." J. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION 345
(1976).
129. See generally Schechter, Untangling the Asbestos Mess, supra note 91.
130. Model Bill, supra note 121, § 10.
131. Id. §§ 7(a)(l)(B), 10.
132. Miller Bill, supra note 88, § 7.
133. Those eligible to file claims under the Miller Bill are listed in section 3 which provides: "All
employers and employees are defined in this Act shall be covered, and coverage shall be
compulsory, rather than elective." Miller Bill, supra note 88, § 3.
An employee is defined as "any individual" [sic] who is employed by an employer, or
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employees would continue to file claims under FECA and would be
allowed to continue filing third-party suits against the manufactur-
ers.134 Since government employees appear to make up a substantial
portion of the plaintiffs, this lack of exclusivity of the Miller Bill would
serve to defeat the purpose of a legislative solution. Although certain
government employees would not be effected by the Miller Bill, the
exclusive remedy for all other asbestos-related claimants would be
under the Miller Bill.
Although providing largely exclusive remedies, the Fenwick and
Hart Bills permit claimants to file claims under applicable workers'
compensation systems in addition to filing claims under the respective
act.'35 Like the Model Bill, however, the Fenwick Bill and the Hart
Bill prohibit claimants from filing third-party suits against contributors
to the Fund.
136
Removing the exclusive remedy provision would, in effect, place a
greater burden on the manufacturers and other third parties than al-
ready exists. Requiring contributions to the Fund would simply add
the expense of contributing to the Fund without removing any of the
current burdens on the courts or the companies. Absent the exclusivity
provision, the legislation would cause more problems than it would
solve.
Apportionment of Contribution: The Asbestos Compensation Fund
The four bills differ dramatically in apportioning liability for com-
pensating persons affected by an asbestos-related disease. The appor-
tionment ranges from inclusion of the cigarette industry tnder the
Fenwick Bill 13 7 to the specific exclusion of the federal government
under the Miller Bill.'38 Because of the attempt to coordinate employ-
ers' liability under existing compensation laws, the differing structures
who was employed by an employer," and employer is defined as "any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, but [such dCfnition] shall not include the
United States or any State or political subdivision thereof." Id. §§ 2(4), 2(5) (emphasis ad-
ded).
An individual affected by an asbestos-related disease would not be eligible to fie a claim
under the Miller Bill if the only exposure to asbestos was while in the employ of the United
States. Pursuant to section 5, the claimant must prove that he or she was an employee ex-
posed to asbestos during the course of employment and that such exposure caused the disa-
bility for which the claimant is seeking compensation. Id. § 5(a). Because the Government
is excluded from the definition of employer, a person would not be eligible to file a claim if
the exposure to asbestos only occurred during the course of employment with the
Government.
134. Pursuant to section 9 of the Miller Bill, supra note 88, compensation to which a claimant is
entitled under the Miller bill constitutes the exclusive remedy for the claimant. Because a
person who was exposed to asbestos while in the employ of the United States is not eligible
to file a claim under the Miller bill, that individual would not be bound by the exclusive
remedy provision. The Government employee, therefore, would not be barred from filing
third party actions.
135. Fenwick Bill, supra note 90, §§ 206(b)(8), 206(d); Hart Bill, supra note 89, §§ 6, 10.
136. Fenwick Bill, supra note 90, § 301; Hart Bill, supra note 89, § 10.
137. Fenwick Bill, supra note 90, §§ 102(10)(c), 102(l l)(A)(iii), 204(b)(3).
138. Miller Bill, supra note 88, § 2(5).
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of the four bills must also be considered when asking the question:
"Who will ultimately pay?"
The Fenwick Bill. The Fenwick Bill's apportionment of contribu-
tions to its Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Fund is unique be-
cause it requires contribution from persons and entities engaged in the
"first sale of cigarettes or cigarette tobacco." 139 It also requires contri-
butions from importers, manufacturers and sellers of asbestos-contain-
ing products."40 The miners of asbestos are not required to contribute
to the Fund.
Three classes of contributors are established under the Fenwick
Bill. Class I includes persons and entities who engage in the manufac-
ture, import of sale of asbestos products whose handling "creates the
likelihood that dust containing asbestos will be produced." 4 ' Class II
includes those persons or entities in whose products asbestos is "sus-
pended in a liquid or emulsion or otherwise locked into the substance
or product. . . so that during handling. . . there is little likelihood
that dust containing asbestos will be produced or asbestos exposure will
result."'142 Class III, the provision unique to the Fenwick Bill, would
require contributions from entities "engaged in the manufacture and
first sale of cigarettes or cigarette tobacco."
1 43
The contributions required by Classes I and II would be two per-
cent and one percent, respectively, of the net domestic sales of products
containing asbestos for the "quarter fifteen years preceding the year in
which payment is made."144 The contribution required by Class III is
3/10th of one percent of the "net domestic sales of cigarettes and ciga-
rette smoking tobacco for the quarter fifteen years preceding the year in
which payment is made."'
45
Noticeably missing from responsibility under the Fenwick Bill are
employers and the government. Those affected by asbestos-related dis-
ease would still be permitted to seek employer contribution by applying
for compensation under a state or federal workers compensation sys-
tem. Awards under the Fenwick Bill, however, would be reduced by
any award received under a workers' compensation program."'
6
With the exception of the average monthly payment under FECA,
benefits under Fenwick are higher than those available under most
compensation systems.' 47 Because any award under the Fenwick Bill
would be reduced by other awards, claimants undoubtedly would
139. Fenwick Bill, supra note 90, §§ 102(11)(A)(iii), 204(b)(3).
140. Id. §§ 102(11)(A)(i), 102(11)(A)(ii), 204(b)(1), 204(b)(2).
141. Id. § 102(11)(A)(i).
142. Id. § 102(11)(A)(ii).
143. Id. § 102(11)(A)(iii).
144. Id. §§ 204(b)(1), 204(b)(2).
145. Id. § 204(b)(3).
146. Id. § 206(d).
147. The Fenwick Bill sets the rate of payment for permanent or temporary total disability at a
"rate equal to the minimum monthly payment to which the Federal employee in grade GS-5
[Vol. 10:25
Asbestos Compensation Act
choose to seek compensation only through the Fund. The end result
would be that the employers would not be required to compensate for
asbestos-related disease caused by exposure to asbestos at their
worksites.
In apportioning responsibility for asbestos-related disease, the Fen-
wick Bill fails in two respects: (1) by not recognizing the government's
role other than that of an employer; and (2) by not providing a system
that insures contribution by employers whose employees are disabled
as a result of occupational exposure to asbestos.
The Hart Bill. Senator Hart's approach to the compensation contri-
bution problem is to set minimum standards for state and federal work-
ers' compensation programs as they pertain to the compensation for
asbestos-related disease. 4 ' Through this legislation, Hart would void
all barriers to compensation currently faced by persons disabled by as-
bestos-related diseases, such as "provisions relating to the time since
the last exposure to asbestos."'
149
Under the Hart Bill, if the minimum standards for compensation
were not met, an injured person would be able to seek the difference
between the award under the workers' compensation system and the
amount that would be awarded under the Hart Bill's minimum stan-
dards. 1 0 Awards would be made to claimants from the Supplemental
Compensation Fund to which employers, including the United States
Government, manufacturers, and distributors of products containing
asbestos would contribute in amounts set by the state or federal work-
ers' compensation board.151 Miners and importers of asbestos, how-
ever, are not specifically named as responsible parties and contributors
to the Fund.
The Hart Bill does not undertake to apportion contributions.
Rather, it establishes a commission whose role is to "develop the crite-
ria and factors which shall be used by State and Federal workers' com-
pensation agencies in apportionment proceedings under [the
bill].... Establishment of the Apportionment Criteria Commis-
sion begs the question of who and in what proportions responsible par-
ties would be required to pay awards. The Commission's role is to
establish "percentage ranges for liability for a variety of factors." '153 It
is the role of the workers' compensation agencies to first determine
of the General Schedule who is totally disabled is entitled at the time of payment under
Chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code." Id. § 206(b)(3).
Currently, the minimum payment at GS-5 is $714.00 per month while the average
monthly payment under FECA is $758.00. See Chart V Income Beneftsfor TotaI Disabilit,
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS COMPENSATION LAWS 15 (1982).
148. Hart Bill, supra note 89, § l(b)(1).
149. Id. § 4(a)(10).
150. Id. § 6(a)(1).
151. Id. §§ 6-8.
152. Id. § 8(b).
153. Id. § 8(c).
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which responsible parties are liable for the individual claim and then to
apportion liability based on the Commission percentage ranges.1
4
Thus, not until the claim is actually apportioned will the amounts paid
by various responsible parties be known.
The system of apportionment and the awards process under the
Hart Bill is unduly complex and inefficient because apportionment
would be done on a case-by-case basis by the existing state or federal
workers' compensation board. The solution to the problem of finding
an efficient, exclusive, and adequate means of compensating persons
affected by asbestos-related disease does not lie in a system which sends
the claimants back to the workers' compensation systems which have
already proved inefficient. Rather, the solution lies in a system under
which one office or agency develops an expertise in asbestos claims by
being the exclusive office to handle those claims.
The Miller Bill. The Miller Bill focuses not only on asbestos-related
diseases but also includes uranium-related diseases in its coverage.' 55
As such, the Miller Bill is designed as a prototype for a system of com-
pensation for occupationally-related diseases and provides for the addi-
tion of other occupational diseases.1 56 The Miller Bill establishes one
fund to which employers, except the federal government, as well as
manufacturers, distributors, and other responsible parties contribute.'57
Sections 11 and 12 of the Miller Bill assign the liability for payment to
the Fund. Pursuant to those provisions, the last employer who em-
ployed the affected person for at least two years, during which time the
employee was more than sporadically exposed to asbestos, is responsi-
ble for 100% of the compensation awarded to the claimant.'58 If, how-
ever, no employer can be determined, the compensation award will be
paid from the Asbestos Compensation Excess Liability Fund estab-
lished under section 12 of the bill.' 5 9
Pursuant to section 12, contributions to the Fund include:
(1) twenty percent from "employers, [excluding the federal govern-
ment], who expose employees to asbestos in the course of employment
with such employers"; (2) fifty percent from "manufacturers and im-
porters of asbestos and of products of which asbestos is a significant
constituent element"; and (3) thirty percent from "manufacturers and
importers of products which contain asbestos but of which asbestos is
not a significant constituent element."' 60
The Miller Bill establishes a more efficient system through its use of
one agency in handling all asbestos-related claims. Rather than coordi-
154. Id. § 7.
155. Miller Bill, supra note 88, § 5(a).
156. Id. § 17.
157. Id. § 12.
158. Id. § 11.
159. Id.
160. Id. § 12(b)(2)(A).
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nating efforts of separate existing workers' compensation agencies
throughout the United States, as Hart proposes, Miller includes em-
ployer responsibility when apportioning contributions to the Fund.
Despite the promise of being an efficient system of compensation, the
Miller Bill's apportionment of liability fails in one crucial respect: it
excludes the federal government as a responsible part.
The Model Bill. The Model Bill establishes the Asbestos Compen-
sation Fund to which contributions are made by the federal govern-
ment, employers, miners, importers, manufacturers, distributors, and
other "responsible parties" involved in the use of asbestos and products
containing asbestos. 161 The apportionment of contributions to the Fund
is as follows: fifty percent of the contributions are made through a tier
system based upon the location in the distribution tier of the contribu-
tor;' 62 twenty percent of the contributions are made by employers;
63
and thirty percent of the contributions are made by the United States
Government. 164
Employers and Government Contributions
The Model Bill constitutes the exclusive remedy for persons dis-
abled by asbestos-related disease. 65 Under the Model Bill, claimants
are barred from filing claims under existing state and federal workers'
compensation laws and may only file under the Model Asbestos Com-
pensation Act. 166 Since employers, including the federal government,
are relieved from liability under the existing programs by this exclusiv-
ity provision, they are required to contribute to the Fund and thereby
carry their share of compensating for their role in the use of asbestos.
Employers are responsible for twenty percent of the total contributions
to the Fund.'
67
The government played a significant role in the use of asbestos; it
was much more than an employer of persons applying asbestos insula-
tion.' 68 The government established workplace standards which gave
positive assurances of safety to other employers, manufacturers, and
employees.' 69 In addition, it was an importer, manufacturer, buyer,
seller, specifier, and stockpiler of asbestos. For its many roles in the use
of asbestos, the government is responsible for thirty percent of the con-
tributions to the Fund, in addition to its contributions as an
employer. 170
161. Model Bill, supra note 121, § 13.
162. Id. § 13(d)(1).
163. Id. § 13(d)(2).
164. Id. § 13(d)(3).
165. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
166. Model Bill, supra note 121, § 10.
167. Id. § 13(d)(2).
168. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.




.Contributions by miners, importers, manufacturers, fabricators, dis-
tributors, and wholesalers make up fifty percent of the Fund.17' Ap-
portionment of contributions are based upon what level of distribution
of asbestos the responsible party was involved. The approach to a the-
ory of contribution is one which reflects the reality of the marketplace.
Each level in the chain of distribution of asbestos is a separate mar-
ket: (1) the primary market comprises the miners and suppliers of raw
asbestos; (2) the secondary market comprises the fabricators of thermal
insulation products which contained asbestos as one component part;
and (3) the tertiary market comprises the distributors or wholesalers of
thermal insulation products which contained asbestos as the compo-
nent part.
Asbestos was placed in the stream of commerce by the members of
the primary market, the miners and importers of raw asbestos, and was
incorporated without change into various products. It is wel accepted
in tort law that a manufacturer of a component part should be liable
for any harm caused by that component.172 The miners and importers
of raw asbestos correspond to the manufacturer in products liability
law to whom retailers can pass back their liability if the product fur-
nished them for sale proves defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Under the Model Bill, the financial resources of the companies in
the primary market would be utilized to compensate the claimants.'73
If the resources of the mining companies and importers are exhausted,
only then would those other tiers of distribution be called upon to con-
tribute to the Fund.
174
The goal of the Model Bill is to assess contributions in an equitable
manner reflecting each responsible party's role in the use of asbestos.
The fact that companies from several markets have been named as de-
fendants in the asbestos cases is simply fortuitous and in no way defines
the relevant market or markets. 7 5 In apportioning liability for asbes-
tos-related disease, therefore, one must do more than count lawsuits.
The role of the entity or the federal government in each and every mar-
ket must be considered in determining what each responsible party's
proportional share will be.
171. Id. § 13(d)(1).
172. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 663-65 (4th ed. 1971).
173. Model Bill, supra note 121, § 13(d)(1).
174. Id. § 13(d)(1)(B)(i).
175. The defendants in the asbestos litigation come from various markets in the chain of distribu-
tion from mining to the application of insulation products. Some defendants are vertically
integrated companies, such as Manville Corporation, which operated at all levels of distribu-
tion. Manville mined and supplied most of the asbestos to the other usual defendants who
were fabricators. In addition, Manville fabricated for distribution or sale significantly more
thermal insulation products containing asbestos than any other fabricator. Most other de-
fendants or their alleged predecessors operated at only one or two levels.
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Presumptions
Presumptions in legislation enable a court or compensation board
to assume that a certain fact exists without the necessity of proof. A
rebuttable presumption is one which may be disproved by facts con-
trary to the presumption. An irrebuttable presumption, however, may
never be disproved despite facts to the contrary. Of the four bills only
the Miller Bill contains rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions; cer-
tain specified diseases are presumed to have resulted from occupational
exposure to asbestos. 176 These presumptions should not be permitted
to stand.
The Black LungAct. Presumptions have had a checkered history in
compensation legislation. The Federal Coal Miner Health and Safety
Act of 1969177 was enacted, in part, to compensate coal miners who
were disabled or died from pneumoconiosis, a chronic lung disease,
which resulted from the inhalation of coal dust. The 1969 Act con-
tained three presumptions relating to the cause of pneumoconiosis in
miners.
178
The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972179 (Black Lung Act), added
another presumption, 180 and, in 1978, a fifth presumption was added to
the Black Lung Act.'"' As part of an effort to salvage this first industry
and government funded compensation system, Congress amended the
176. Miller Bill, supra note 88, § 5(b).
177. It stated:
(1) if a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for ten
years or more in one or more underground coal mines there shall be a rebuttable presump-
tion that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment;
(2) if a deceased miner was employed for ten years or more in one or more under-
ground coal mines and died from a respirable disease there shall be a rebuttable presumption
at his death was due to pneumocomosis; and
(3) if a miner is suffering or suffered from a chronic dust disease of the lung which (A)
when diagnosed [indicates complicated pneumoconiosis] then there shall be an irrebuttable
presumption that he is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that his death was due to
pneumoconiosis or that at the time of his death he was disabled by pneumoconiosis, as the
case may be.
30 U.S.C.A. §§ 801, 901 (1971) [hereinafter cited as The 1969 Act]. The 1969 Act is found at
Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1970). See 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws 2503 for
the legislative history.
178. The 1969 Act, supra note 176, § 921(c)(1), (2), (3) (emphasis added).
179. The new presumption provided that ifa miner was employed for 15 years or more in under-
ground mines, even though the miner's X-ray is negative and does not establish pneumoconi-
osis, "if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment" then the miner is rebuttably presumed to have been impaired by
pneumocomosis.
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, §§ 3(a), 4(b)(2), 86 Stat. 153 (current
version at 30 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West Supp. 1982)).
180. This amendment provided benefits for the survivors of a miner who dies before March 1,
1978 if the miner had been employed in coal mines for at least 25 years prior to July 1971.
The benefits would be paid unless it was established that the miner had not been partially or
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C.A. § 921(c)(4) (West Supp. 1982) (empha-
sis added).
181. The Black Lung Benefits Reform and Revenue Acts of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 96
(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 901, 921(c)(5)). For a general discussion of the Black Lung Act and
the use of presumptions, see DeCarlo & Veiweg, FederalBlack Lung Law andInsurance in a
Nutshell, I 1 FORUM 661 (1976); Bandolf & Humphreys, Black LungBents ReforA Mirage
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Black Lung Act in 1981.182 As of January 1, 1982, three of the five
presumptions were eliminated.' 83 Under the three deleted presump-
tions, a claimant had been able to apply for and receive benefits with
little or no proof that the miner had pneumoconiosis. Under the Black
Lung Act as it exists today, claimants must prove the causal relation-
ship between the work and the injury.
Presumptions Under The Miller Bill. The presumptions included in
the Miller Bill are similar to those included in the Black Lung Act prior
to the 1981 amendment. In both cases, claimants may avoid proof of
causality through the use of presumptions. *Thus, a claimant need not
prove that the disease for which compensation is claimed is causally
related to the occupational exposure to asbestos: a claimant need
merely prove occupational exposure to asbestos and the existence of
one of the presumed asbestos-related diseases.
The Miller Bill creates three presumptions. Occupational exposure
to asbestos is: (1) irrebuttably presumed to cause mesothelioma of the
pleura or peritoneum;' 84 (2) irrebuttably presumed to cause asbesto-
sis; t 85 and (3) rebuttably presumed to cause lung cancer, except that, if
the claimant provides evidence of "asbestotic changes" in the lung or
pleura, the presumption becomes irrebuttable.1
8 6
In proposing these presumptions, the drafters of the Miller Bill ig-
nore recent medical research. As a result, the manufacturers of asbes-
tos and products containing asbestos would be forced to compensate
persons whose diseases may have been caused by something other than
exposure to asbestos.
The presumption that exposure to asbestos causes lung cancer is the
most objectionable. By eliminating the necessity of proof of a causal
relationship between lung cancer and exposure to asbestos, the pre-
sumption makes compensable a disease which asbestos may not cause
by itself, and, moreover, ignores many known causes of lung cancer
such as nickel,'87 beryllium, 88 and cigarettes. Such a presumption is
tantamount to legislating a diagnosis which medical and epidemiologi-
or Reality, 28 LAB. L.J. 555 (1977); and Note, The Black Lung Benefits Reform and Revenue
Acts of 1977, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 539 (1978). See generally infra note 182.
182. The two which remain are: the first presumption which creates the rebuttable presumption
that a miner's pneumoconiosis arises from working 10 or more years in coal mines; and the
third presumption which creates the irrebuttable presumption that a miner suffering from a
chronic dust disease has complicated pneumoconiosis if medical evidence indicates consider-
able lung damage. The Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-1 19, 95
Stat. 1644 (to be codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 901) [hereinafter cited, as amended, as
the Black Lung Act].
183. 30 U.S.C.A. § 921(c)(1), (3) (West Supp. 1982).
184. Miller Bill, supra note 88, § 5(b)(1).
185. Id. § 5(b)(2).
186. Id. § 5(b)(3).
187. Doll, Mathews & Morgan, Cancer ofthe Lung and Nasal Sinuses in Nickel Workers: A Reas-
sessment ofthe Period fRisk, 34 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 102 (1977).
188. See O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 210 (July 29, 1982).
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cal data does not support. 89
Doctor Harry B. Demopoulus, who specializes in the diagnosis of
asbestos-related disease, disputes any epidemilogical data which claims
a relationship between asbestos and lung cancer on the grounds that
other significant variables have not been accounted for such as diet,
smoking, and alcohol intake. 9 ° Other doctors and researchers have
similarly concluded that in asbestos workers bronchogenic carcinoma is
uncommon without the presence of some other factor such as cigarette
smoking. 191 In a recent article, one author examined those studies
which claim that asbestos, by itself, can cause lung cancer' 92 and con-
cluded from her own survey, that-there is no scientific or medical proof
that exposure to asbestos alone causes lung cancer. 93 The statistics
from the studies she surveyed showed that, in individuals who were
smokers and whose histories indicated a high concentration of expo-
sure to asbestos, the incidence of lung cancer was higher than was ex-
pected in the general population. 94 In non-smoking individuals who
were similarly exposed to asbestos, however, the incidence of lung can-
cer was lower than expected in the general population.
95
By legislating the presumption that lung cancer was caused by as-
bestos exposure, the Miller Bill would place on the asbestos defendants
the additional and onerous burden of compensating injured persons for
an injury which was not necessarily caused by their product. Recent
medical research has determined that zeolites, a natural substance
found in many products, including toothpaste and chicken feed, causes
mesothelioma. 6 In addition, a recent study published by the Ameri-
can College of Physicians and written by doctors who are on the staff of
Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York concludes that there is no
189. Weill, Hughes & Waggenspack, Influence ofDose and Fiber Type Respiratory Malignancy
Risk in Asbestos Cement Manufacturing, 120 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 345, 353
(1979).
190. Demopoulus, Summary of Conference: Major Discussion Points and Societal Interrelation-
ships, 3 J. ENVTL. PATHOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 473-474 (March 1980) (summarizes sympo-
sium entitled "Cancer and the Environment: An Academic Review of the Environmental
Determinants of Cancer Relevant to Prevention").
191. Craighead & Mossman, The Pathogenesis of Asbestos-Associated Diseases, 306 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1446, 1451 (1982). In Asbestos: Vance Sees OSHA Proposal by Late 1983; Industry
Representatives Criticize Lag, supra note 104, Dr. Hans Weill, professor of medicine at Tu-
lane University, is quoted as saying: "Slowly we have begun to realize that there are occupa-
tional groups and subgroups that demonstrate no excess lung cancer in the asbestos
industry." Id.
192. B. Billauer, Asbestos Causes Lung Cancer-Or Does It? (Sept. 1982) (unpublished article).
193. Id. at 35, 38.
194. Billauer, supra note 192.
195. Id. at 31, 33, 35.
196. Newhouse, Epidemiology ofAsbestos-Related Tumors, 8 SEMINARs IN ONCOLOGY 250 (Nov.
1981); Baris, An Outbreak of Mesothelioma and Chronic Fibrosing Pleurisy in the Village of
Karain/Urgup inAnatolia, 33 THORAX 181 (1978); Artvinli & Bans, Malignant Mesothelioma
in a Small Village in the Anatollan Region of Turkey: An Epidemiologic Study, 63 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. (July 1979); Baris, Artvinli & Sahin, Environmental Mesotheloma in Turkey,
330 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 423 (1979). See generally Storey, Cancer that Killed Their
Ancestors Now is Killing Their Turkish Village, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 1981, at 7.
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asbestos connection for thirty percent of the mesotheliomas studied.'97
Although there are many unanswered questions concerning zeolites
and other substances and their relation to mesothelioma, the irrebut-
table presumption which ignores altogether the role of these substances
is inappropriate.
To avoid the problems faced in the Black Lung Act and to avoid
requiring the manufacturers to compensate for injuries for which no
causal relationship can be drawn between the injury and the exposure
to asbestos, the Fenwick, Hart and Model Bills do not include pre-
sumptions. Rather, these bills require that the claimant establish both
the existence of disease and that the disease was caused by exposure to
asbestos.
Two of the four bills go even further by recognizing the contribu-
tion not only of asbestos but also of other factors in causing asbestos-
related disease. The Fenwick Bill provides for contributions by the cig-
arette industry on grounds that "lung cancer at rates dramatically and
substantially above the general average occurs in persons who inhale
asbestos coupled with the inhalation of cigarette tobacco smoke." 198
The Model Bill attempts to apportion the liability for diseases in
asbestos workers when the diseases are determined to result from other
factors in addition to exposure to asbestos. Section 13(f) of the Model
Bill provides that "[i]n addition to the entities described above, any
entity shall contribute to the fund if the Secretary determines that it or
its products had any role in contributing to the disease for which com-
pensation is sought."' 199
Considering the uncertainty and differing conclusions as to the
cause or causes of the diseases involved, presumptions are inappropri-
ate. Cause and effect between the disease suffered and the exposure to
asbestos must be established and proved.
Application of Insurance Policies
The three asbestos companies which have filed for relief under
Chapter 11 have cited the overwhelming litigation and the failure of
their insurance companies to defend the lawsuits and pay awards and
settlements as principal reasons for filing their petitions.2' Many man-
ufacturers of asbestos have been forced to litigate with their insurance
carriers to obtain the coverage provided by the insurance policies they
have purchased.20 Many of the insurance coverage cases are still
197. Chahinian, Pajak, Holland, Norton, Ambinder & Mandel, D.fiese Malignant Mesothelioma,
96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 746 (July 1982).
198. Fenwick Bill, supra note 90, § 101(a)(3). See generaly Selikoff, Seidman & Hamrnond,Mor-
tality Effects of Cigarette Smoking Among Amosite Asbestos Factory Workers, 65 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 507 (Sept. 1980); Selikoff & Hammond, Asbestos & Smoking, 242 J. A.M.A.
458 (Aug. 1979) (editorial).
199. Model Bill, supra note 121, § 13(f).
200. See supra note 79.
201. See supra note 76-77 and accompanying text.
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pending and, until resolved, the manufacturers, and not their insurance
carriers, must bear, in whole or in part, the financial burden for which
they believe they were insured.
In an effort to avoid further insurance coverage litigation, the Hart
Bill and the Model Bill provide for the application of insurance policy
benefits toward a responsible party's contribution to the Fund. The
Hart Bill provides that:
Each contractor of insurance under which compensation benefits
are provided to or for employees of any responsible party made to
cover occupational diseases, disabilities, or deaths as a result of expo-
sure to asbestos shall be deemed to provide benefits in accordance with
the minimum standards contained in section 4 of this Act.
20 2
Any policies or contracts of insurance issued by a carrier to indem-
nify and/or defend a responsible party which policies or contracts of
insurance would be applicable to claims against any responsible party
for damage due to an asbestos-related disease shall be applicable to
any contribution required or otherwise determined to be due from a
responsible party under this Act.
20 3
The inclusion of specific provisions concerning insurance coverage
does not give additional rights to the responsible parties; it merely pre-
serves existing rights under any new system of compensation. Thus,
while coverage disputes may continue, new disputes by insurance carri-
ers will not be generated by the adoption of an Asbestos Compensation
Act.
Household Exposures
Pending litigation includes cases brought by persons who allege
they are suffering from asbestos-related disease although they have
never been occupationally exposed to asbestos. The only exposure they
know of, it is alleged, is indirect, as through a member of their house-
hold who was occupationally exposed to asbestos. In many of these so-
called "household exposure" cases, plaintiffs rely on studies which con-
clude that mesothelioma may be caused by indirect exposure to asbes-
tos, such as exposure to dust covered clothes of household members
who were occupationally exposed to asbestos dust.2"
Only the Miller Bill fails to recognize the need to compensate
household exposure cases where a causal connection between the
mesothelioma and the occupational exposure to asbestos of a house-
hold member is shown. The Fenwick Bill,20 5 the Hart Bill206 and the
Model Bill,20 7 on the other hand, recognize the need for relief for asbes-
tos-related disease that was the vicarious result of occupational expo-
202. Hart Bill, supra note 89, § 1l(e).
203. Id. § 11(d).
204. See Anderson, Lilis, Daum & Selikoff, supra note 45.
205. Fenwick Bill, supra note 90, §§ 101(a)(2) and 102(2).
206. Hart Bill, supra note 89, § 3.
207. Model Bill, supra note 121, at § 4.
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sure to asbestos. This relief is provided despite the fact that it was not
the employee who developed the asbestos-related disease but rather a
member of the employee's household.
CONCLUSION
The Model Asbestos Compensation Act provides a prompt, ade-
quate, exclusive, equitable, and reasonably uniform system of compen-
sation for persons disabled as a result of exposure to asbestos.
The filing of claims with the Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams allows that office to develop an expertise in handling asbestos
compensation claims; this gives the system the efficiency to promptly
dispose of asbestos claims. Adequacy of the system is assured by provi-
sions which allow 100% of medical and rehabilitation expenses20 8 and
non-taxable wage-loss compensation of at least 66 2/3% of the affected
person's average weekly wage.2" 9 Exclusivity is provided for parties
required to contribute to the Asbestos Compensation Fund in exchange
for their "no fault" contributions to the Fund. Finally, equitable com-
pensation and reasonably uniform awards will be provided since
awards will better reflect the degree of disability resulting from asbes-
tos-related disease rather than the uneven awards resulting under cur-
rent litigation.
The Model Bill does not absolve the United States from contribut-
ing its fair share of liability for asbestos-related disease;210 includes an
exclusive remedy provision;211 apportions contributions on the basis of
the roles the responsible parties played in the use of asbestos; 212 elimi-
nates all presumptions of the cause of disease; specifies that contribu-
tions to the Fund will be covered by contributors' insurance policies;
213
and provides for compensation of persons disabled by asbestos-related
disease caused by household exposure.21 4
Legislation similar to the Model Asbestos Compensation Act is a
rational and fair solution to the asbestos compensation problem.
208. Id. § 5(e).
209. Id. § 5(b), 5(e).
210. Id. § 3(a)(15).
211. Id. § 10.
212. Id. §§ 12-13.
213. Id. § 13(b).




THE MODEL ASBESTOS HEALTH
HAZARDS COMPENSATION ACT
A BILL
To provide prompt, adequate, exclusive, and equitable compensation
for diseases or death resulting from exposure to asbestos, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Asbestos Health
Hazards Compensation Act."
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
SECTION 2. (a) The Congress finds that-
(1) a significant number of people suffer disability or death or
both from occupational diseases caused by the inhalation or ingestion
of asbestos;
(2) members of households of persons who are occupationally ex-
posed to asbestos may suffer from asbestos-related diseases;
(3) asbestos-related diseases occur among individuals employed
in both the private sector and public sector,
(4) diseases arising from exposure to asbestos constitute a sub-
stantial burden upon interstate commerce and have an adverse effect
on the public welfare;
(5) diseased and disabled workers and their survivors deserve,
and the public interest will be best served by, prompt, adequate, exclu-
sive, and equitable compensation;
(6) the prime method for providing such compensation, State laws
governing occupational disease and disability, do not in many cases
provide prompt, adequate, exclusive, and equitable compensation;
(7) the inability of persons injured by such diseases to obtain ade-
quate workers' compensation benefits places great strain on the family
resources of the injured persons, and on public medical and income
support systems;
(8) the general inability of workers' compensation laws to provide
prompt, adequate, exclusive, and equitable compensation to occupa-
tional disease victims has encouraged those injured persons to seek
compensation through liability suits and other judicial action;
(9) the burgeoning litigation associated with those occupational
disease cases, places great strain on the judicial system of the United
States; and
(10) all parties directly or indirectly responsible for the occur-
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rence of occupational asbestos disease, including but not limited to the
Federal Government and those who sold asbestos or products contain-
ing asbestos, should participate in the compensation of individuals
who suffer from such asbestos-related disease; and
(11) the participation referred to in subsection (10) hereof should
be in an equitable manner and should be the exclusive remedy for
those suffering from an occupationally caused asbestos-related disease.
(b) It is the purpose of this Act-
(1) to establish a national compensation system to provide
prompt, adequate, exclusive, and equitable compensation to-
(A) any person disabled by an asbestos-related disease result-
ing from occupational exposure to asbestos;
(B) any person disabled by an asbestos-related disease result-
ing from the occupational exposure to asbestos of a member of such
disabled person's household;
(C) dependents of a deceased person whose death from an as-
bestos-related disease results from the occupational exposure to as-
bestos; and
(D) dependents of a deceased person whose death from an as-
bestos-related disease results from the occupational exposure to as-
bestos of some member of the deceased person's household;
(2) to provide a mechanism under which all responsible parties,
including but not limited to the Federal Government and those who
sold asbestos or products containing asbestos, equitably share the cost
of such compensation.
DEFINITIONS
SECTION 3. (a) For the purposes of this Act-
(1) The term "asbestos" means chrysotile, amosite, and crocido-
lite and, when they occur in fibrous form, tremolite, anthrophyllite,
and actinolite.
(2) The term "asbestos-related disease" means asbestosis,
mesothelioma causally related to asbestos exposure of the pleura or
peritoneum, bronchogenic cancer causally related to asbestos exposure,
or any other disease which the Secretary determines results from expo-
sure to asbestos, and adds to the above list by regulation.
(A) In promulgating any regulation adding to, altering, or
amending the list of asbestos-related disease as defined herein the
Secretary shall comply with the rulemaking requirements of section
553 of title 5, United States Code, and the hearing requirements of
sections 556 and 557 of title 5, United States Code. These sections
shall apply as if the Secretary were the agency referred to therein.
(B) In determining whether any other disease results from ex-
posure to asbestos, the Secretary shall determine whether any fac-
tors or substances, other than asbestos, contributed to the
development of such disease. If the Secretary determines that other
factors or substances contribute to such disease, the Secretary shall
also determine the amount of contribution of each such factor and
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shall accordingly adjust the contribution required under section 13
of this Act.
(3) The term "affected person" means-
(A) a person disabled by an asbestos-related disease resulting
from occupational exposure to asbestos;
(B) a person disabled by an asbestos-related disease resulting
from the occupational exposure to asbestos of a member of such
disabled person's household;
(C) a deceased person whose death from an asbestos-related
disease resulted from the occupational exposure to asbestos; or
(D) a deceased person whose death from an asbestos-related
disease resulted from the occupational exposure to asbestos of some
member of the deceased person's household.
(4) The term "child" means a natural or adopted child or a
stepchild who-
(A) is unmarried; and
(B) (i) has not attained eighteen (18) years of age; or
(ii) is currently under a disability as defined in section
223(d) of the Social Security Act which began before such person
attained the age of twenty-two (22) or, in the case of a student,
which began before the person ceased to be a student; or
(iii) is a student, as defined in this Act.
(5) The term "claimant" means an individual who is eligible to
seek compensation under this Act, by meeting one of the subsections of
section l(b)(1).
(6) The term "compensation" means benefits made available
under this Act to a claimant, and shall include, but not be limited to-
(A) "monetary benefits" paid to a claimant;
(B) "medical benefits" including payments for or the provision
of the services of physicians, hospital care, nursing, ambulance,
prosthetic devices, and other related services, drugs, and medicines
relating to the care or physical rehabilitation of an affected person.
(7) The term "dependent" means-
(A) a child of an affected person; and
(B) a spouse--(i) who is a member of the same household as
the affected person; (ii) who is receiving regular contributions from
the affected person for his support; (iii) whose spouse or former
spouse is an affected person who has been ordered by a court to
contribute to such person's support; or (iv) who meets the require-
ments of section 216(b)(1) or (2) of the Social Security Act.
(8) The term "disability" shall mean either a "total disability" or
a "partial disability."
(A) The term "total disability" has the meaning given it by the
regulation of the Secretary. Such regulation shall provide that an
affected person shall be considered totally disabled when, by reason
of an asbestos-related disease, such person's prior level of earnings
had decreased 60 per centum taking into consideration age, training
and local conditions. For purposes of this definition, an affected
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person's level of earnings shall be his average annual earnings over
the highest three of the last five years, excluding any compensation
for overtime, immediately preceding the affected person's applica-
tion for benefits under this Act. The level of earnings of an affected
person who has not been employed within that period shall be mea-
sured by the affected person's earning capacity as if such person
were not disabled. Such determination shall take into considera-
tion the affected person's age, training and local conditions.
(B) The term "partial disability" means a condition that re-
sults in less than total disability as defined in this Act.
(9) The term "employee" means any individual who is employed
by an employer or who was employed by an employer and, for the
purposes of this Act, shall include members of the household of an
employee occupationally exposed to asbestos.
(10) The term "employer" means any person employing individu-
als and engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce, and
shall include the United States of America, any State or any public
agency or political subdivision of such state or of the United States.
(11) The term "Federal workers' compensation laws" means the
laws of the Federal Government which provide compensation for
death and disability resulting from occupational diseases.
(12) The term "insurance carrier" means any person or fund au-
thorized under section 11 to insure liabilities under this Act or any
person, company or fund which provided insurance including product
liability insurance to any person or entity which is required to pay any
sums under this Act.
(13) The term "Longshore Act" means the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. 901 et seq).
(14) The term "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs"
means that agency of the United States Department of Labor which is
established to receive, process, and pay workers' compensation claims
under the various Federal workers' compensation laws.
(15) The term "responsible party" in each case shall include any
corporation, partnership, individual, joint venture, or any other entity,
or the United States, any State or any public agency or political subdi-
vision of the United States or of any State, which-
(A)(i) employs or employed the affected person or a member
of the affected person's household who was occupationally exposed
to asbestos during such employment;
aa) there shall be no immunity from the provisions of this Act by
reasons of any exclusivity provision of any workers' compensation
act or similar immunity; or
(ii) engages or has engaged in the mining, import, manu-
facture, or sale of asbestos fiber or any product or substance con-
taining asbestos which, by weight of reasonable scientific evidence,
is determined to contribute to the incidence of asbestos-related dis-
ease, disability, or death; or
(B) is determined by the Secretary or the Commission to have
contributed to the occupationally related asbestos-related disease or
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death or whose products contributed to the asbestos-related disease
or death for which compensation may be paid under this Act.
The term "responsible party" may include the Federal Government,
any State or any public agency or political subdivision of such State or
Federal Government regardless of whether such Government or
agency qualifies under subparagraph (A) of this section.
(16) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Labor or the
Secretary's designee.
(17) The term "State" means each of the several States, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Is-
lands, Guam, and American Samoa.
(18) The term "State average weekly wage" means the average
weekly earnings of workers on private payrolls with the State as deter-
mined by the Secretary of Labor.
(19) The term "State compensation insurance fund" means that
fund which may be established in a State to underwrite the provision
of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to the workers' compensa-
tion laws of such State.
(20) The term "State workers' compensation laws" means the
laws of each State which provide compensation for death and disabil-
ity resulting from occupational diseases.
(21) The term "student" means a full-time student as defined in
section 202(d)(7) of the Social Security Act.
(22) The term "widow" includes the wife living or dependent for
support on the affected person at the time of his death, or living apart
for reasonable cause or because of his desertion, or who meets the re-
quirements of section 216(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), or (c)(5) and sec-
tion 216(k) of the Social Security Act, who is not married. The
determination of an individual's status as the widow of an affected per-
son shall be made in accordance with section 216(h)(1) of the Social
Security Act as if such affected person were the insured individual re-
ferred to therein. Such term also includes a surviving divorced wife
who, for the month preceding the month in which the affected person
died, was entitled to or receiving from the affected person at least one-
half of her support, or was receiving substantial contributions from the
affected person (pursuant to written agreement), or there was in effect a
court order for substantial contributions to her support from the af-
fected person at the time of his death.
(23) In the case of a claimant who is a woman, references in this
Act to the wife or widow of such affected person shall be deemed to
refer to the husband or widower. Terms in the masculine include the
feminine and vice versa.
APPLICABILITY
SECTION 4. The provisions of this Act shall apply only to disabil-
ity or death of an affected person resulting from such person's occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos, or resulting from the occupational exposure
to asbestos of a member of such person's household.
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COMPENSATION FOR DISABILITY OR DEATH
SECTION 5. (a) Compensation shall be available under this Act
for death, for total disability, and for partial disability.
(1) Compensation for total disability shall be paid in any case in
which, as a result of an asbestos-related disease, the affected person is
totally disabled as defined in section 3(8)(A).
(2) Compensation for partial disability shall be paid in any case
in which the affected person is partially disabled as a result of an asbes-
tos-related disease and the post-disability wage earning capacity of the
affected person is less than 70% of that person's gross weekly wage
prior to the disability, taking into consideration age, training, and local
conditions.
(b) Compensation for total disability or death due to an asbestos-
related disease shallbe as follows:-
(1) Monetary benefits for total disability or death due to an asbes-
tos-related disease shall not be less than 66 2/3 per centum of the aver-
age gross weekly wage of the affected person for the highest three of
the five years immediately preceding the beginning of total disability
or prior to death, excluding any bonuses and compensation for
overtime.
(2) If the case of an employee who was not employed at the time
of the death or the onset of total disability, monetary benefits shall not
be less than 66 2/3 per centum of the employee's average gross weekly
wage for the highest three of the last five years during which the em-
ployee was employed, excluding any bonuses and compensation for
overtime.
(3) Compensation provided for in this subsection shall be in-
creased by 50 per centum of the difference between the compensation
provided under section 5(b)(1) or 5(b)(2), whichever is applicable, and
80 per centum of the average gross weekly wage of the affected person
for the highest three of the five years, excluding only any bonuses and
compensation for overtime, immediately preceding the beginning of
total disability or prior to death if the claimant has one dependent, and
by 100 per centum of the difference if the claimant has two or more
dependents, but compensation shall in no case be more than 80 per
centum of the affected person's average weekly wage for the highest
three of the five years immediately preceding the beginning of the total
disability or prior to death, excluding any bonuses and compensation
for overtime.
(c) Compensation for partial disability due to an asbestos-related
disease shall be as follows:
(1) Monetary benefits for partial disability due to an asbestos-re-
lated disease shall not be less than 66 2/3 per centum of the difference
between the average gross weekly wage of the affected person for the
highest three of the five years immediately preceding determination of
partial disability, excluding any bonuses and compensation for over-
time, and the wage-earning capacity of the affected person after the
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disability taking into consideration age, training, and local employ-
ment conditions.
(2) Compensation provided for in section 5(c)(1) shall be in-
creased by 25 per centum of the difference between the compensation
provided under section 5(c)(1) and 80 per centum of the average gross
weekly wage of the affected person for the highest three of the five
years immediately preceding the beginning of partial disability, ex-
cluding any bonuses and compensation for overtime, if the claimant
has one dependent, and by 50 per centum of the difference if the claim-
ant has two or more dependents, but compensation shall in no case be
more than 80 per centum of the affected person's average weekly wage
for the highest three of the five years immediately preceding the begin-
ning of partial disability, excluding any bonuses and compensation for
overtime.
(d) In the case of an affected person whose disability or death was
caused by an asbestos-related disease resulting from the occupational
exposure to asbestos of a member of such affected person's household,
compensation shall be as follows:
(1) If such affected person was employed, the monetary compen-
sation shall be calculated in accordance with section 5(b) or section
5(c).
(2) If such affected person was not employed outside of the home,
the monetary compensation shall be 50 per centum of what the prime
wage earner in the affected person's household would be awarded
under section 5(b) or section 5(c), as though the prime wage earner was
the affected person.
(e) Medical benefits on account of the death, or total disability or
partial disability of any affected person shall be provided for all reason-
able and necessary medical, hospital, surgical, and associated expenses
resulting from treatment of the asbestos-related disease, including the
expense of drugs or treatments or nursing care required in the treat-
ment of such asbestos-related disease or in the rehabilitation of the af-
fected person.
(f) With the eruption of section 5(d), Benefits shall be indexed on
the basis of any change in the wage scale of the job which the affected
person held and which the affected person would still hold if the af-
fected person had not been disabled or had not died, except that bene-
fits may be recomputed once the affected person attains the normal age
of retirement or otherwise would have experienced a change in income
if the claimant had remained on that job.
(g) Benefits shall be paid for the duration of the disability, or for
the life of the claimant, whichever is less, without limitation as to the
dollar amount or the period of payment.
(h) Benefits shall be paid to the widow or widower of a claimant
for life or until remarriage or habitual cohabitation with a person as if
in marriage. If a widow or widower remarries or is determined to be
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habitually cohabiting, two years' benefits shall be paid by in a lump
sum to such widow or widower, except that-
(1) if there is one or more surviving child, 50 per centum of the
benefits payable under this subsection shall be payable to such surviv-
ing child or children who shall share equally;
(A) Benefits to each such surviving child shall cease when such
person is no longer a child within the meaning of section 3(a)(4).
(2) if there is no surviving spouse, the amounts of benefits payable
to any surviving children shall include the amount which would other-
wise have been payable to such surviving spouse.
(i) Each employer shall make a reasonable effort to reemploy a
rehabilitated affected person, who was an employee of that employer,
in a position commensurate with his age, training, and medical
condition.
(j) Any claimant, employer, or responsible party may apply to
have monetary benefits previously awarded pursuant to this subsection
redetermined based upon an increase or decrease in the degree of disa-
bility of the affected person; except that such redeterminations may be
requested no more frequently than once every twelve months. Such
application shall be made and determined in accordance with this pro-
visions of sections 7 through 9 of this Act.
(k) The Secretary shall by regulation prescribe minimum stan-
dards for determining whether an affected person is disabled due to
asbestos-related disease; or whether the death of an affected'person was
due to asbestos-related disease.
(1) Regulations required by this subsection shall be promulgated
and published in the Federal Register at the earliest practicable date
after the date of enactment of this Act, but in no event later than one
hundred and twenty days after this Act is enacted.
(2) In promulgating such regulations the Secretary shall comply
with the rulemaking requirements of section 553 of title 5, United
States Code, and the hearing requirements of sections 556 and 557 of
title 5, United States Code.
(A) These sections shall apply as if the Secretary were the
agency referred to therein.
(3) Such regulations shall provide that-
(A) claimants seeking benefits under this Act must demonstrate
that such affected person has, in fact, developed a disabling asbestos-
related disease;
(B) in making the determination that an affected person has
developed a disabling asbestos-related disease, all relevant evidence
shall be considered, including the history of such person's exposure to
asbestos which evidence shall include, but not be limited to, physical
examinations, x-ray examinations, medical tests such as pulmonary
function studies, blood gas studies and studies of ventilatory capacity




(C) medical histories, hospital records, physician's reports, and in
the case of a deceased affected person, autopsy report and death certifi-
cates, and other appropriate material shall be considered;
(D) the Secretary shall accept the interpretation of a physician
who is board certified or board eligible in the fields of preventive
medicine/occupational health, pulmonary medicine, or radiology, of a
chest roentgenogram which is of acceptable quality submitted in sup-
port of a claim for benefits under this Act, if such roentgenogram has
been taken by a radiologist or qualified radiologic technologist or tech-
nician, except when the claim has been fraudulently represented.
(4) The regulations shall further provide that- (A) for any dis-
ease which is known to have causes other than asbestos, a determi-
nation shall be made as to whether the claimant was exposed to
such other causes.
(i) In the event that an affected person was exposed to
such other causes, a determination shall be made as to the percent
of the disease caused by exposure to asbestos and the percent attrib-
utable to other cause. When it is determined that some cause other
than asbestos contributed to the affected person's asbestos-related
disease, either the claimant's benefits under this Act shall propor-
tionally be reduced or the Secretary shall require proportionate
contribution to the Asbestos Compensation Fund by a responsible
party pursuant to Section 13(f) of this Act.
(5) In no event shall there be any presumption of asbestos-related
disease based solely on exposure of any person to asbestos or the length
of exposure of any person to asbestos.
(1) (1) No compromise or release of any compensation or medical
or rehabilitation benefits shall be effective unless approved by the Of-
fice of Workers' Compensation, based on a determination by such of-
fice that such compromise or release is in the best interest of the
claimant, and will not adversely affect any program of rehabilitation.
(2) No waiver, release, or similar instrument relating to future
coverage or compensation under any State workers' compensation law
or under this Act that is executed prior to the death or onset of disabil-
ity resulting from any exposure to asbestos or uranium ore shall be
effective under any circumstances unless the release is given in consid-
eration of payment received.
(m) Compensation paid pursuant to this Act will not offset or be
offset by any other benefits paid to claimants nor be considered as in-
come for tax purposes.
ELIGIBILITY FOR COMPENSATION
SECTION 6. (a) A claimant shall be eligible for compensation
under this Act upon a determination that-
(1) (A) the affected person was exposed to asbestos in the course
of employment; or
(B) a member of the affected person's household was
exposed to asbestos during the course of employment; and
19831
Journal of Legislation
(2) (A) (i) the affected person is or was disabled by a disease
associated with exposure to asbestos; and
(ii) the disease was caused by exposure to asbestos; or
(B) (i) the affected person's death was caused by a disease
associated with exposure to asbestos; and
(ii) the disease was caused by exposure to asbestos; and
(3) an award of compensation for such disability or death has not
been made under a State workers' compensation law, the Longshore
Act, the Federal Employees Compensation Act or in settlement or
judgment of a claim or lawsuit based upon such disease or death and a
judgment denying compensation for the disability or death has not
been rendered.
(b) With respect to all claims for compensation based on disability
or death from asbestos-related disease, the claimant shall be eligible for
benefits pursuant to this Act upon proof that the exposure to asbestos
significantly and substantially contributed to or aggravated the disa-
bling disease or significantly and substantially contributed to the death.
The contribution recoverable under this Act shall be reduced based
upon the contribution by other causes to the disability or death unless
such proportionate share is contributed pursuant to section 13(f) of this
Act.
PROCEDURE FOR MAKING CLAIMS
SECTION 7. (a) The procedure for giving notice of a disability
or death due to an asbestos-related disease in as follows:
(1) (A) Notice of a disability or death for which compensation is
payable under this Act shall be given within one year after the onset of
such disability or the date of death except that-
(i) with respect to a death which occurred prior to the ef-
fective date of this Act, or with respect to a disability the onset of
which occurred prior to the effective date of this Act, and for which
no award of compensation has been made under a State workers'
compensation law or under the Longshore Act, Federal Employees
Compensation Act or in settlement or judgment of a claim or law-
suit based upon such disease or death, a notice may be ified within
one year after the effective date of this Act; and
(ii) the time for filing a notice shall not begin to run in any
event, until the employee has a compensable disability and the em-
ployee or claimant is aware, or through the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been aware, of the causal relationship of the
disability or death to the occupational exposure to asbestos.
(B) Such notice shall be-
(i) filed with the Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams in the district in which the employee resides or the district in
which the employee worked, and
(ii) given to the employer.
(C) Failure to notify the employer to whom ultimate liability
is assigned shall not bar such a claim for compensation and failure
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to file a notice with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
shall not bar the filing of a claim under subsection (b), but the Sec-
retary may provide by regulation to accord higher priority to the
consideration of claims which are properly preceded by a notice.
(2) Such notice shall be in writing, shall be in a form which shall
be prescribed by the Secretary, and shall contain the name and address
of the claimant, the name and address of the affected person, the name
and address of the employee who was occupationally exposed to asbes-
tos, and the identity of the employer and the place of employment at
which the claimant believes the employee was last employed and ex-
posed to asbestos. Such notices shall be signed by the employee, the
affected person, the claimant, or by some person on his or her behalf.
(b) A claim for compensation for disability or death shall be filed
with the Office of Workers' Compensation Program in the district in
which the claimant resides or the district in which the employee
worked. Such claim for compensation shall be filed within two years
after the onset of the disability or the death; except that-
(1) with respect to a death which occurred prior to the effective
date of this Act, or with respect to a disability the onset of which oc-
curred prior to the effective date of this Act, and for which no award of
compensation has been made under a State workers' compensation law
or under the Longshore Act, Federal Employees Compensation Act or
in settlement or judgment of a claim or lawsuit based upon such dis-
ease or death, a claim may be fied within two years after the effective
date of this Act;
(2) the time for filing a claim shall not begin to run in any event,
until the employee has a compensable disability and the employee or
claimant is aware, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have been aware, of the causal relationship of the disability or
death to the occupational exposure to asbestos; and
(3) when a claimant has filed a notice of disability in a timely
fashion pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, in a case in which the
disability has not at that time resulted in a wage loss, a claim for com-
pensation for disability filed pursuant to this subsection shall be timely
if filed within one year after the occurrence of a wage loss due to such
disability.
(c) There is no limitation on the filing of a claim for compensation
due to disability or death under this Act based on the length of time
since the employee was last employed, or last exposed to asbestos.
(d) In the case of an affected person whose household member
was occupationally exposed to asbestos, any reference in this section,
and subsequent sections, to the employer shall mean the employer of
the household member who was occupationally exposed to asbestos.
PROCEDURE FOR ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS
SECTION 8. (a) Upon receipt of a notice of disability, notice of
death, or claim for compensation filed pursuant to section 7, the Office
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of Workers' Compensation Programs shall establish a claim file, assign
a designating number to that file, and notify the employer named in the
notice or claim and the claimant of the file number within thirty days.
Thereafter, the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs shall make
or cause to be made such investigation as is necessary to ascertain
whether the employer named in the notice or claim employed the em-
ployee, and whether the employee, while so employed, was exposed to
asbestos in a manner and of a duration which would appear to make
such an employer responsible for the payment of benefits pursuant to
section 12 of this Act. If the Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams determines that the employer named in the notice or claim did
not employ the employee, or did not expose the employee to asbestos in
the course of employment, or otherwise is not a responsible employer,
the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs shall so notify the
claimant and the employer named in the notice or claim, and shall in-
clude, in such notification, the reasons therefore. Such notice shall be
served personally or by registered mail.
(b) The Secretary shall promulgate procedures to notify all re-
sponsible parties liable for contributions to the Asbestos Compensation
Fund in the event that no responsible employer is identified after the
investigation required under subsection (a) of this section.
(c) The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs shall make or
cause to be made such investigations as is considered necessary with
respect to the claim for compensation to confirm that the claimant has
an asbestos-related disease and is disabled from such disease, which
disease must be established by competent medical evidence, and shall
order a hearing thereon upon application of the claimant, the responsi-
ble employer. If no hearing is requested within thirty days after notice
is given pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Office of Work-
ers' Compensation Programs shall issue an order awarding or denying
compensation. If a hearing on such a claim is ordered, the hearing
shall be conducted by an administrative law judge who shall give the
claimant, the responsible employer, and the responsible employer's in-
surance carrier at least two weeks' notice of such hearing (served per-
sonally or sent by registered mail), and shall, within thirty days after
the conclusion of such hearing, issue a decision awarding or denying
compensation. Upon receipt of such decision, the Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs shall issue an order awarding or denying
compensation in accordance with such decision.
(d) Any hearing held under this section shall be conducted in ac-
cordance with the provisions of section 554 of title 5, United States
Code. Such administrative law judge shall have all powers, duties, and
responsibilities vested in hearing officers under the Longshore Act.
(e) (1) The order awarding or denying compensation shall be filed
with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, and a copy
thereof shall be sent by registered mail to the claimant and to the re-
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sponsible employer and the responsible employer's insurance carrier, if
such responsible employer is identified, at the last known address of
each.
(2) The order awarding or denying compensation shall be filed
with the State workers' compensation agency and the State insurance
commissioner in the State in which the responsible employer or has a
principal place of business.
(3) In the event that no responsible employee was identified, a
copy of the order awarding or denying compensation shall be sent by
registered mail to all responsible parties liable for contribution under
section 13 of this Act.
(f) An award of compensation for disability may be made after
the death of the disabled employee.
(g) At any time after a claim for compensation has been filed with
the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, such claim may be
transferred to another district of the Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs for the purpose of making an investigation, taking testimony,
making physical examinations, and taking such other necessary action
thereon as may expedite the adjudication of the claim.
APPEALS
SECTION 9. (a) A compensation order shall be fied in the Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs and copies of it sent in accord-
ance with section 8(e) of this Act on the same day. The order shall
become effective on the day of mailing. Unless proceedings for the
appeal of such order have been instituted pursuant to subsection (b) of
this section, such order shall become final at the expiration of the thirti-
eth day thereafter, except that, if the thirtieth day falls on a weekend or
legal holiday, the order shall become final at the expiration of the next
day which is not a weekend or a legal holiday.
(b) Any claimant, employer, responsible party or insurance carrier
who is effected by an order awarding or denying compensation may file
a petition for review of such order or award with the Benefits Review
Board [hereinafter referred to as the "Board"] established by section 21
of the Longshore Act.
(c) (1) In review proceedings under this section, the decision of the
Board shall be based upon the evidence in the record before the Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs or the administrative law judge.
(2) The findings of fact by the Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole.
(d) Any final order of the Board shall be enforceable and review-
able in accordance with section 21 of the Longshore Act.
EXCLUSIVITY AND THIRD PARTY LIABILITY
SECTION 10. (a) The compensation to which a claimant is enti-
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tied under this Act shall constitute the claimant's exclusive remedy
against any employer or the parent or subsidiary or subsidiaries or
predecessors or affiliates or successors thereto of such entities or past or
present officers or directors or employees or shareholders thereof, the
employer's insurer or collective bargaining agent of the employer's em-
ployees, or any employee, officer, director, or agent of such employer,
insurer, or collective bargaining agent (while acting within the scope of
his or her employment) for any illness, injury or death compensable
under this Act.
(b) No person or persons entitled to file a claim for benefits pursu-
ant to this Act or who would have been entitled to file such a claim but
for the expiration of limitation of action periods as set forth in this act
or such other persons whose claim would be derivative therefrom shall
be allowed to recover for damages, including but not limited to actual,
consequential, or survivorship, for bodily injury or death caused by an
asbestos-related disease, loss of consortium, or for exemplary or puni-
tive damages relating to such exposure, against a present or former
(1) miner, importer, manufacturer, distributor, seller, contractor,
or applicator of asbestos fibers, or materials, or the parent or subsidiary
or subsidiaries or predecessors or affiliates or successors thereto of such
entities or past or present officers or directors or employees or share-
holders thereof,
(2) any other responsible party as defined in this act,
(3) the United States of America,
(4) the insurers of those entities in (1), (2), and (3), or
(5) a union which has represented such persons for collective bar-
gaining or the parent organization of such union.
(6) For the purpose of this subsection, liability actions against
such third parties shall include, but not be limited to, all actions
brought for or on account of personal injury, disease, physical or
mental impairment, disability or death caused by or resulting from the
manufacture, construction, installation, alteration, design, formulation,
preparation, assembly, testing, warning, instruction, marketing, pack-
aging, or labeling of any product. It shall include, but not be limited
to, all actions for damages based upon the following theories: strict
products liability; negligence; breach of warranty, express or implied;
breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether
deliberate, negligent, or innocent; misrepresentation, concealment, or
disclosure, whether fraudulent, negligent, or innocent, or any other ac-
tion for damages based upon any theory hereinafter adopted by any
court.
(c) Any recovery for disability or death from an asbestos-related
disease obtained prior to the effective date of this Act against any third
party whether by judgment, award, or settlement in a liability action
described in this subsection shall be the claimant's and affected per-
son's exclusive remedy and shall preclude the claimant from seeking
recovery under the Act.
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(d) Any lawsuit which a claimant or affected person pursued to
final determination or settlement before the effective date of this Act
shall bar a claimant from filing a claim under this Act even if the
claimant or affected person received no award under such lawsuit.
(e) No employer or insurance carrier of such employer shall have
any lien upon any judgment rendered in any such third party liability
action brought as a result of any disability or death arising out of or in
the course of employment with such employer, nor any right of subro-
gation in connection with any such third party liability action.
(f) (1) No third party may commence any action for indemnity,
contribution, or other monetary damages against any party immune
from suit by a claimant by reason of subsection (a), based on the liabil-
ity of such third party to any claimant for any contributions or benefits
paid under this Act.
(2) Section 10(b)(5)(A) shall not affect any action for indemnity,
contribution or other money damages which was commenced prior to
the effective date of this Act or which pertains to liabilities incurred
other than under this Act.
EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPENSATION AND
INSURANCE
SECTION 11: (a) (1) Every employer shall be responsible for
payment of compensation which may be payable to its employees
under this Act, and shall secure the payment of compensation under
this Act-
(A) by insuring and keeping insured the payment of such com-
pensation with any stock company or mutual company or associa-
tion, or with any other person or fund, or State compensation
insurance fund, while such person or fund is authorized-
(i) under the laws of the United States or any State, to in-
sure workers' compensation, and
(ii) by the Secretary, to insure payment of compensation
under this Act; or
(B) by furnishing satisfactory proof to the Secretary of its
financial ability to pay such compensation and receiving an author-
ization from the Secretary to pay such compensation directly.
(2) The Secretary, as a condition to an authorization under para-
graph (1)(B), may (A) require such employer to deposit in a depository
designated by the Secretary either an indemnity bond or securities (at
the option of the employer) of a kind and in an amount determined by
the Secretary, and (B) require such additional conditions as the Secre-
tary may prescribe, which shall include authorization to the Secretary
in case of default to sell any such securities sufficient to pay compensa-
tion awards or to bring suit upon such bonds, to procure prompt pay-
ment of compensation under this Act. Any employer securing
compensation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1)(B)
shall be known as a self-insurer.
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(b) In granting authorization to any carrier to insure payment of
compensation under this Act, the Secretary may take into consideration
the recommendation of any State insurance commissioner or other
State authority having supervision over carriers or over worker's com-
pensation, and may authorize any carrier to insure the payment of
compensation under this Act in a limited territory. Any insurance cor-
poration or association, authorized to write insurance against liability
for loss or damages from personal injury and death or workers' com-
pensation, shall be deemed a qualified carrier to insure compensation
under this Act. The Secretary may suspend or revoke any such author-
ization for good cause shown after a hearing at which the carrier shall
be entitled to be heard in person or by counsel and to present evidence.
No suspension or revocation shall affect the liability of any carrier al-
ready incurred.
(c) In any case where the employer is not a self-insurer, in order
that the liability for compensation imposed by this Act may be most
effectively discharged by the employer, and in order that the adminis-
tration of this Act in respect of such liability may be facilitated, the
Secretary shall by regulation provide for the discharge, by the carrier
for such employer, of such obligations and duties of the employer in
respect to such liability, imposed by this Act upon the employer, as the
Secretary considers proper in order to effectuate the provisions of this
Act. For such purposes (1) notice to or knowledge of an employer of
the occurrence of the injury shall be notice to or knowledge of the car-
rier, (2) jurisdiction of the employer by the Office of Workers' Compen-
sation Programs, the Board, or the Secretary, or any court under this
Act shall be jurisdiction of the carrier, and (3) any requirement by the
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, any administrative law
judge of the Department of Labor, the Board, or the Secretary, or any
court under any compensation order, finding, or decision shall be bind-
ing upon the carrier in the same manner and to the same extent as upon
the employer.
(d) (1) Every policy or contract of insurance issued under authority
of this Act shall contain (A) a provision to carry out the provisions of
subsection (d), and (B) a provision that insolvency or bankruptcy of
the employer or discharge therein shall not relieve the carrier from
payment of compensation for disability or death sustained by an em-
ployee during the life of such policy or contract.
(2) No contract or policy of insurance issued by a carrier under
this Act shall be cancelled prior to the date specified in such contract or
policy for its expiration until at least thirty days have elapsed after a
notice of cancellation has been sent to the Office of Workers' Compen-
sation Programs and to the employer.
ASSIGNMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
SECTION 12. (a) Upon the final award of compensation pursu-
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ant to this Act, responsibility for the payment of compensation shall be
established in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) If the claimant is determined to be eligible pursuant to section
6 of this Act, in the case of an employee whose disability or death was
related to occupational exposure to asbestos, responsibility for the pay-
ment of benefits to such claimant shall be assigned to the employer who
last employed such employee, unless such employer shall sustain the
burden of proving that it did not expose such employee to asbestos for
two years or more, or that the exposure was only casual and sporadic in
nature. If the last employer which employed the employee did not em-
ploy the employee for two years or more, or did not expose the em-
ployee to asbestos (other than casually or sporadically) for two years or
more in the course of such employment, the responsibility for the pay-
ment of benefits shall be assigned to the Asbestos Compensation Fund
established pursuant to section 13 of this Act.
ASBESTOS COMPENSATION FUND
SECTION 13. (a) There is hereby established the Asbestos
Compensation Fund, for the payment of all compensation benefits
awarded pursuant to this Act, where no employer responsible for the
payment of such benefits has been identified. Compensation benefits
shall be paid by the funds on a nonreserved basis.
(b) (1) Insurance coverage available to any manufacturer or im-
porter of asbestos or asbestos containing products, including but not
limited to general comprehensive liability coverage shall be available
to pay any and all contributions to the Asbestos Compensation Fund
or other contributions required under the Act.
(2) Insurance coverage available to any employer, including but
not limited to workers' compensation insurance, whether from a li-
censed carrier or from a State compensation insurance fund estab-
lished to secure payment to employees for occupationally related
injuries or diseases, shall be available to pay any and all contributions
to the Asbestos Compensation Fund or other contribution required
under the Act.
(c) (1) (A) The Asbestos Compensation Fund shall pay all
compensation benefits due on account of awards of compensation
due to disability or death resulting from occupational exposure to
asbestos where no responsible employer for the payment of such
benefits has been determined pursuant to the provisions of section
12 of this Act.
(B) No later than September 1 of each year, the Secretary shall
determine the amount of contributions to be made to the fund for
the following calendar year. In making the determinations, with
respect to the total amounts necessary to sustain the fund for the
following year, the Secretary shall consider the past experience of
the fund, anticipated obligations of the fund in the following year,
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the relative obligations of the responsible parties, and other appro-
priate data and actuarial projections.
(2) On the basis of the amount established by the Secretary as the
total amount of contributions to be made to the fund for the following
calendar year, the Secretary shall determine the contribution of re-
sponsible parties according to the system of contributions established
in this section. The Secretary shall notify the employers' workers'
compensation carriers or State insurance funds, and all responsible
parties, of the amounts of contributions required for the following cal-
endar year.
(d) (1) 50 per centum of the contributions to the fund shall be made
based upon the tier in the distribution process in which the contributor
is based. The tiers shall be as follows:
(A) (i) Tier 1. 50 per centum of the amount needed for the fund
in any one year shall be made by contributions from the miners or
importers of asbestos.
(ii) For the purposes of Section 13(f), a manufacturer,
fabricator, or processor of asbestos-containing products shall enjoy
the limitations on third-party liability contained in Section 10 of
this Act if it purchased asbestos directly or indirectly from a miner
or imposition of asbestos which is required to or has made contri-
butions under this Act.
(B) (i) Tier 2. In the event that the contributions from the min-
ers or importers of asbestos is insufficient to provide 50 per centum
of the amount needed for the fund in any one year than the addi-
tional contributions to the fund shall be made by the manufactur-
ers, fabricators, or processors of products containing asbestos.
(ii) 70 per centum of any contributions to the fund made
by manufactureres, fabricators, or processors of products contain-
ing asbestos shall be made by manufacturers, fabricators, or proces-
sors of products of which asbestos is a significant constituent
element and 30 per centum of such additional contributions to the
fund shall be made by manufacturers, fabricators, or processors of
products which contain asbestos but of which asbestos is not a sig-
nificant element.
(aa) an asbestos content or more than 30% of all be
considered a product in which asbestos was a significant element;
(bb) In computing contributions in accordance with
subsection (D), the sales figures for products containing significant
amounts of asbestos shall be computed separately from products of
which asbestos is not a significant element.
(iii) For the purposes of section 13(f), a distributor or
wholesaler of products containing asbestos shall enjoy the limita-
tions on third-party liability contained in Section 10 of this Act if it
purchased products containing asbestos directly or indirectly from a
manufacturer, fabricator, or processor which is required to make
contributions or has made contributions under this Act or is pro-
tected by subsection 13(d)(1) (B)(ii).
(C) Tier 3. In the event that contributions from the miners,
importers and the manufacturers, fabricators or processors of asbes-
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tos is insufficient to provide 50 per centum of the amount needed
for the fund in any one year, then contributions to the fund shall be
made by the next tier in the distribution process, that is, distributors
or wholesalers of products containing asbestos.
(D) In no event shall contributions to the fund from any party
in any tier exceed 2 per centum of gross sales of products containing
asbestos or 10 per centum of net profits of products containing as-
bestos, whichever is less. In determining these percentages a frac-
tion shall be created with gross sales or net profits of asbestos-
containing products from 1940 to the date of the contribution as the
numerator of the calculation and the number of years from 1940 to
the date of the calculation as the denominator of the calculation.
(2) In accordance with section 13, 20 per centum of the contribu-
tions to the fund shall be made by employers who expose or exposed
employees to asbestos in the course of employment with such
employers.
(3) 30 per centum of the contributions to the fund shall be made
by the United States Government.
(e) (1) In addition to the contributions otherwise required under
this Section, the Secretary shall determine whether any responsible
party, employer, or the United States Government had an additional
role in contributing to asbestos-related disease. If the Secretary deter-
mines that one or more of such persons or entities had an additional
role in contributing to asbestos-related disease, the Secretary may re-
quire such party to make an additional contribution to the Fund. In
determining whether such party had an additional role in contributing
to asbestos-related disease, the Secretary shall consider the following:
(A) control of the workplace environment including establish-
ing exposure limits for the workplace environment;
(B) the party or parties responsible for working conditions at
the workplace;
(C) the party or parties responsible for the design, formula,
testing, warning, instruction, marketing, packaging, distribution, or
labeling of asbestos fiber or any asbestos-containing product which
is determined to contribute to the incidence of asbestos-related dis-
ease, disability or death;
(D) the party or parties responsible for promulgating specifica-
tions pursuant to which products containing asbestos were
designed, manufactured or sold; and
(E) the party or parties having knowledge of the connection
between asbestos and disease prior to 1950.
(2) Any party required to make contributions under this subsection
shall not enjoy the limitations or contributions found in subsection
(d)(1)(D) to this section.
(f) In addition to the entities described above any entity shall con-
tribute to the fund if the Secretary determines that it or its products had
any role in contributing to the disease for which compensation is
sought.
(g) Any contributions made pursuant to subsection (e) or (f) of
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this section, shall be applied to the amount of contributions needed for
the Fund for a given year, thereby reducing the total amount for which
contributions will be required.
(h) Except as provided in subsections (d)(1)(B)(ii) and
(d)(l)(C)(iii), no responsible party which has not paid its contribution
as required pursuant to section 13(i), in accordance with a schedule
prescribed by the Secretary for such payment, shall enjoy the limita-
tions on third party liability provided in section 10 of this Act with
respect to any liability action instituted during any period beginning on
the date on which the contributor was due and ending on the date on
which such contributor has paid in full that contribution and any suc-
ceeding contributions which have become due.
(i) There is established in the Treasury of the United States an
Asbestos Compensation Fund. Such Fund shall be administered by
the Secretary. The Treasurer of the United States shall be the custo-
dian of such Fund, and all moneys and securities in such Fund shall be
held in trust by such Treasurer and shall not be money or property of
the United States.
(1) The Treasurer is authorized to disburse moneys from such fund
only upon order of the Secretary. He shall be required to give bond in
an amount to be fixed and with securities to be approved by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury and the Comptroller General of the United States
conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duty as custodian of
such fund.
(2) (A) The contributions of miners, importers, manufacturers,
fabricators, processors, and distributors, and importers of asbestos
or of products containing asbestos shall be collected each year by
the Secretary and deposited into the fund. The proportionate share
of each contributor shall be based on the sale of asbestos or asbes-
tos-containing products of each such contributor during the previ-
ous fifteen years, except that, if the Secretary determines that sales
over the previous fifteen years do not accurately reflect the overall
market share of any such responsible party, the Secretary may, for
such responsible party, assess contributions based on sales over any
fifteen-year period since January 1, 1940.
(3) (A) If a responsible party fails or refuses to pay an assess-
ment required to be paid under this section within thirty days after
notification thereof, or fails or refuses to comply with a rule
promulgated pursuant to this Act, the Secretary is authorized to
bring a civil action in the appropriate United States district court to
require the payment of such assessment or compliance with such
rule.
(B) A responsible party who fails or refuses to pay any assess-
ment required to be paid under this section may be assessed a civil
penalty by the Secretary in such amount as the Secretary may pre-
scribe, but not in excess of an amount equal to 50 per centum of the
assessment the responsible party failed or refused to pay. Such pen-
alty shall be in addition to any other liability of the responsible
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party under this Act. Penalties assessed under this paragraph may
be recovered in a civil action brought by the Secretary and penalties
so recovered shall be deposited in the fund.
(4) All amounts collected as fines and penalties under the provi-
sions of this chapter shall be paid into such fund.
(5) To each contribution to the Asbestos Compensation Fund,
shall be added the following surcharge:
(A) an amount equal to five per centum of each contribution,
which shall be used by the Secretary to pay the costs incurred by
the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, the Division of
Administrative Law Judges, and the Board in connection with
claims filed pursuant to this Act, except that if in any year the
amounts provided by this surcharge exceed the costs of program
administration the Secretary shall direct that the surcharge for the
following year shall be correspondingly reduced; and
(B) an amount equal to one per centum of each contribution,
which shall be available for use in research in discovering and de-
veloping a cure for asbestos-related disease pursuant to the provi-
sions of section 17 of this act.
(6) The Treasurer of the United States shall deposit any moneys
paid into such fund into such depository banks as the Secretary may
designate and may invest any portion of the funds which, in the opin-
ion of the Secretary, is not needed for current requirements, in bonds
or notes of the United States or of any Federal land bank.
(7) Neither the United States nor the Secretary shall be liable in
respect of payments authorized under this section in an amount greater
than the money or property deposited in or belonging to such fund.
(8) The Comptroller General of the United States shall audit the
account for such fund, but the action of the Secretary in making pay-
ments from such fund shall be final and not subject to review, and the
Comptroller General is authorized and directed to allow credit in the
accounts of any disbursing officer of the Secretary for payments made
from such fund authorized by the Secretary.
(9) At the close of each fiscal year the Secretary shall submit to
the Congress a complete audit of the fund.
(j) If the amounts assessed and collected for the benefit of the
fund in any year are in excess of the liabilities of the fund for such year,
the contributions to the fund for the following year shall be adjusted to
reflect the claims experience of the fund during the previous year. Such
adjustments shall be made by the Secretary, in consultation with the
State insurance commissioners, and shall be reflected in the following
year's assessment rate, and the assessment reductions shall be allocated
among the responsible parties in accordance with their allocated rates
of contributions to the funds established in this section.
(k) Except as provided in subsections (d)(1)(A)(ii) and
(d)(l)(B)(iii) no miner, importer, manufacturer, fabricator, processor,
wholesaler, or distributor of asbestos or of products containing asbestos
shall enjoy the limitations on third party liability provided in Section
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10 of this Act if such miner, importer, manufacturer, fabricator, proces-
sor, wholesaler, or distributor does not participate in the Asbestos
Compensation Excess Liability Fund established in this section.
PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
SECTION 14. (a) Compensation under this Act shall be paid
periodically, in accordance with the schedule for payment of workers'
compensation benefits of the law of the State in which the employer
responsible for the paying of such compensation shall reside or have its
principal place of business, or, if no responsible employer is identified,
in accordance with the schedule of workers' compensation benefits
which shall be promulgated by the Secretary, upon the issuance of a
final compensation order pursuant to section 8 or 9 of this Act.
(b) (1) Upon making the first payment of compensation, the em-
ployer or the employer's insurance carrier shall notify the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, the State worker's compensation
agency, and the State insurance commissioner of the commencement
of the payment of compensation, the amount of compensation to be
paid, and the schedule for the payment of compensation.
(2) Upon suspension of payment in any case, the employer or em-
ployer's insurance carrier shall immediately notify the claimant, the
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, the State workers' com-
pensation agency, and the State insurance commissioner of such sus-
pension, and the reason therefor.
(3) Annually, within thirty days after the anniversary date of the
commencement of compensation payments under this Act, the em-
ployer or the employer's insurance carrier shall fie with the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, the State workers' compensation
agency, and the State Insurance Commissioner, a report detailing the
total amount of monetary benefits paid in connection with such claim
and the medical benefits paid in connection with such claim during
that year.
(4) The failure to file any of the notices required by this subsec-
tion shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each
such failure.
(c) (1) When the payment of compensation has been suspended,
upon the request of any recipient of the compensation, the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs shall conduct an investigation of
the case and the reasons for suspension of the payments, and shall
make a determination with regard to the suspension of the payment. If
the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs finds that such pay-
ments were improperly suspended, it shall order the employer to com-
mence payment of the compensation, and all suspended payments
shall be paid to the person entitled thereto with interest at a rate equal
to 20 per centum per annum of the amount so ordered to be paid.
(2) Any person who is aggrieved by an order of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs with respect to suspended payments
may appeal from such order to the Board in accordance with the pro-
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cedures in section 9 of this Act. Orders issued pursuant to this section
shall be enforceable in accordance with section 21 of the Longshore
Act.
(d) If any compensation payable under the terms of an award or
order of compensation pursuant to this Act is not paid within twenty-
one days after such award or order shall become final, or if any install-
ment of compensation is not paid within twenty-one days after such
award or order shall become final, or if any installment of compensa-
tion is not paid within fourteen days of the date of which such compen-
sation is due, there shall be added to such compensation or
compensation payment, an amount equal to 20 per centum thereof,
which shall be paid to the person entitled to such compensation at the
same time as, but in addition to, the compensation payment, unless
review of the compensation award or order is pending pursuant ot sec-
tion 8 of this Act, and an order staying such payment has been issued
by the Board, or the court.
DISCRIMINATION
SECTION 15. (a) No responsible party may discriminate on the
basis of race, creed, color, national origin, age, sex, handicapped condi-
tion, prior employment in the asbestos industry, or past exposure to
asbestos, against a claimant or any other person directly involved in
making a claim pursuant to this Act. No responsible party may dis-
criminate against a claimant for exercising any rights under this Act or
exercising any right under applicable State or Federal workers' com-
pensation laws.
(1) Any claimant who believes that he has been discharged or
otherwise discriminated against by any responsible party covered by
this Act in violation of section 4, subsection 12 of this Act may, within
ninety days after such violation occurs, apply to the Secretary for a
review of such alleged discharge or discrimination. A copy of the ap-
plication shall be sent to such person who shall be the respondent.
Upon receipt of such application, the Secretary shall cause such inves-
tigation to be made as he deems appropriate. Such investigation shall
provide an opportunity for a public hearing at the request of any party
to enable the parties to present information relating to such violation.
The parties shall be given written notice of the time and place of the
hearing at least five days prior to the hearing. Any such hearing shall
be of record and shall be subject to section 554 of title 5 of the United
States Code. Each hearing examiner presiding under this section shall
receive compensation at a rate not less than that prescribed for GS-16
under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code. Upon receiving the
report of such investigation, the Secretary shall make findings of fact.
If he finds that such violation did occur, he shall issue a decision, in-
corporating an order therein, requiring the person committing such vi-
olation to take such affirmative action as the Secretary deems
appropriate, but not limited to, the rehiring or reinstatement of the
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claimant to his former position with back pay. If he finds that there
was no such violation, he shall issue an order denying the application.
Such order shall incorporate the Secretary's findings therein.
REPRESENTATION FEES
SECTION 16. (a) The Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams, the administrative law judge, the Board, or court, as shall be
appropriate, shall determine a reasonable representation fee taking into
account the responsibility assumed by the representative, the complex-
ity of the case, the care exercised in developing the case, the time in-
volved, and the results involved, if-
(1) the employer or the employer's insurance carrier declines to
pay any compensation on or before the thirtieth day after receiving
written notice of a claim for compensation having been filed from the
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs; or
(2) the employer or the employer's insurance carrier suspends
payment of compensation, and the person seeking benefits, or the per-
son seeking resumption of the suspended compensation payments shall
thereafter have utilized the services of a representative in the successful
prosecution of such claim;
(b) Such representation fee shall be paid to the representative in
one lump sum, directly, by the employer or the employer's insurance
carrier involved, within two months after the order of compensation
shall become final.
(c) (1) In cases where a representation fee is awarded pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section, there shall also be assessed an amount for
the payment of costs, fees, and mileage for necessary witnesses attend-
ing the hearing at the instance of the claimant. Both the necessity of
the witnesses and the reasonableness of the fees of expert witnesses
must be approved by the administrative law judge, Board, or court, as
the case may be.
(2) The amount assessed for such costs and fees shall also be paid
to the claimant's representative, directly by the employer or insurance
carrier, as may be appropriate, in one lump sum, for disbursement by
that representative, to the witnesses, or as may be required.
(d) Any person who receives any fees or other consideration, or
any gratuity on account of services rendered as a representative of a
claimant, unless such consideration or gratuity is approved by the ad-
ministrative law judge, Board, or court, or who makes it a business to
solicit employment for an attorney at law or for himself in respect to
any claim or award of compensation, shall upon conviction thereof, for
each offense be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by im-





SECTION 17. (a) The Secretary, in conjunction with the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services, shall provide for the annual award
of research grants to persons or entities conducting research or moni-
toring research whose purpose is to discover or develop a cure for any
asbestos-related disease.
(b) In furtherance of this objective, the Secretary, in conjunction
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall establish a pro-
cedure to receive and evaluate proposals for research and development
projects concerning the cure of any asbestos-related disease and to
award research grants to those persons or entities whose proposals will
best serve the objective of this section.
(c) Any person or entity receiving funding under this section shall
annually report to the Secretary and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services with respect to the research project undertaken pursu-
ant to this section.
(d) All research programs undertaken pursuant to this section
shall be conducted with funds available under the surcharge estab-
lished in subsection (D or section 13 of this Act.
MISCELLANEOUS
SECTION 18. (a) The Secretary may prescribe such rules, regu-
lations, and guidelines under this Act as he deems necessary. All such
rules, regulations, and guidelines shall be published in the Federal
Register at least thirty days prior to their effective date.
(b) The Secretary may make such grants, contracts, or agree-
ments, establish such procedures, and make such payments, install-
ments, and advance by way of reimbursement, or otherwise allocate or
expend funds made available under this Act as he deems necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act. The Secretary may make necessary
adjustments in payments on account of overpayments or
underpayments.
(c) The Secretary is authorized, by cooperative agreement to carry
out the duties of a responsible party under this Act for each department
and agency of the Federal Government.
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM-
SECTION 19. An assignment of a claim for compensation under
this subchapter is void. Compensation and claims for compensation
are exempt from claims of creditors.
ANNUAL REPORT
SECTION 20. Within one hundred and twenty days following the
convening of such regular session of each Congress, the Secretary shall
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prepare and submit to the President for transmittal to the Congress a
report upon the subject matter of this Act and the progress toward
achievement of the purpose of this Act.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SECTION 21. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums
as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
SEPARABILITY
SECTION 22. If any provisions of this Act, or the application of
such provision to any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid,
the remainder of this Act, or the application of such provision to per-
sons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid,
shall not be affected thereby, except that Section 10 shall not operate to
relieve any party of liability if any provision of this Act requiring pay-
ments or contributions is held invalid or if the application of such pro-
vision to such party is held invalid, exempt that if section 13(d) is held
to be invalid as to any responsible party, then the entire Act is invalid
as to that party unless that party affirmatively elects to make itself sub-
ject to the he Act.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SECTION 23. (a) Except as otherwise provided therein, the pro-
visions of this Act shall become effective six months after the date of
enactment of this Act.
(b) Any claimant who, as of the effective date of this Act, has
pending in any Federal court or any court in any of the several States,
an action at common law to recover damages on account of any asbes-
tos-related disease, as defined in section 2 of this Act, may, within one
hundred and twenty days of the effective date of this Act upon first
dismissing with prejudice such action at common law, elect to proceed
under the provisions of this Act. Any claimant no so electing, or who
has pursued a claim to settlement or final determination in an action at
law, shall not be entitled to benefits under this Act.
(c) Should the remainder of this Act be declared null and void,
the claimant electing to proceed under the provisions of this Act shall,
within one hundred and twenty days from the date of the final order
declaring the remainder of the Act null and void, be permitted to rein-
stitute his or her action to recover damages with respect to asbestos-
related disease.
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